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Sovereignty for whom? How parts of the Western right help Moscow

From votes in Washington and Brussels to Russian loans and a British bribery conviction: the same political fault line takes different forms. The evidence reveals a powerful current against support for Ukraine — alongside a right that sees Russia as the threat.

A data illustration comparing support for a Ukraine resolution in three European Parliament groups.
A data illustration comparing support for a Ukraine resolution in three European Parliament groups. · GYDRA · original data visualisation · Original GYDRA graphic

Updated 21 September 2026 · Every election and event is dated

For the Kremlin, a useful ally need not fly a Russian flag. A party can condemn the invasion and still oppose the weapons, financing or sanctions that make resistance possible. That is the central contradiction in part of Europe’s radical right: defending sovereignty at home while seeking to restrict the means by which Ukraine defends its own. Yet the evidence also identifies a substantial Atlanticist wing. Treating the two as identical obscures where Moscow actually gains influence.

What “far right” means here

“Far right” is a research umbrella for the radical and extreme right. The radical right accepts elections but challenges liberal safeguards such as minority rights and pluralism. The extreme right rejects democracy itself; some organisations also legitimise political violence. Classification rests on documented ideology and conduct, with sources and dates. Conservatism, patriotism, national identity or support for national defence alone do not qualify.

This directory distinguishes legal parties, civil movements and paramilitary groups. Their votes, membership, armed strength and online reach are not interchangeable measures. Shared lists are counted once; missing figures mean unverified or inapplicable, not zero. Historical links do not automatically classify a present military unit or an entire country. US movements do not stand for all Republicans; Russian groups do not stand for all Russians. Inclusion does not imply a common position on Ukraine or Kremlin funding.

A majority — but of whom, and on which question?

The strongest comparison is a common test, rather than a collection of provocative quotations. On 24 February 2026, the European Parliament voted on a resolution affirming Ukrainian sovereignty, calling for stronger military support and sanctions, and demanding further separation from Russian energy. Within the three groups most relevant to the nationalist right, opposition plus abstention amounted to 90 of 150 recorded votes: 60%. Against votes alone were 45 of 150, or 30%. Calling the entire 60% ‘pro-Russian’ would erase a meaningful difference.

The group breakdown is more revealing than the combined number. ECR recorded 51 votes for, two against and six abstentions. Patriots for Europe recorded eight for, 21 against and 39 abstentions. ESN recorded one for and 22 against. Those are three very different political profiles. The result supports a precise conclusion: on this test, resistance to the resolution was concentrated in Patriots and ESN, while ECR largely backed it.

It does not establish that a majority of all far-right parties in Europe are controlled by Moscow. A parliamentary group is not a single party; these groups include differently classified parties; the UK, Norway and Switzerland are absent from this vote. Nor is abstention a declaration of geopolitical neutrality. The country atlas below therefore separates military aid, sanctions, electoral support and documented Russian connections. Where the record is incomplete, it says so. europarl.europa.eu howtheyvote.eu popu-list.org

Across the Atlantic: one fracture, different mechanisms

In the United States, this conflict has reached the centre of a major party holding the House majority. On 20 April 2024, 112 House Republicans opposed the Ukraine aid bill and 101 supported it; one voted ‘present’ and four did not vote. The bill nevertheless passed, 311–112. This is a concrete historical measure of the split within the American right, not a classification of every Republican as far right. The political importance lies in the leverage: opposition inside a major party can threaten assistance on a scale that marginal European movements cannot. clerk.house.gov

Britain reveals a different route: access to political voices. The Nathan Gill judgment establishes an individual bribery operation, with instructions and prepared statements entering parliamentary debate. On the continent, Russian loans, cooperation agreements and anti-sanctions programmes show several routes of influence operating together. Their effects can converge even when their origins differ. A paid intervention, an ideological preference and an electoral calculation are not the same thing — but each can weaken the coalition supporting Ukraine. judiciary.uk lorientlejour.com newsv2.orf.at afd.de

The Balkans make a simple Russia-versus-Ukraine label still less adequate. The European Commission’s November 2025 report said Serbia had not joined EU sanctions against Russia, while also noting support for Ukraine and cooperation against sanctions circumvention. Serbia is a comparison of state policy here, not another party added to the far-right count. Alongside the contrasting Croatian, Slovenian, Bulgarian and Greek profiles, it shows why one must distinguish sanctions, weapons and diplomatic alignment instead of colouring the whole region red. enlargement.ec.europa.eu

The pattern is therefore best understood as a coalition of interests rather than a uniform command structure. For some actors, hostility to Brussels or the liberal establishment takes priority over resisting Moscow. For others, the perceived Russian threat makes support for Ukraine part of national defence — the Nordic and Italian counterexamples matter for precisely this reason. The decisive question is what these parties would actually stop, fund or approve once they acquire power. ambkiev.esteri.it

Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: AfD leads with 38.2%

AfD received 38.2% of second votes in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, ahead of SPD on 35.5%, according to the official preliminary result. This strengthens its regional electoral position, but is neither a nationwide victory nor an automatic route into government. The 37% shown in the 18:00 screenshot was a forecast, not the election result. These figures concern the state parliament, not the Bundestag; government formation is a separate process. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern electoral authority · Official preliminary result

Why electoral weight matters more than a headcount of parties

Counting one small movement and one governing party as one unit each can badly misrepresent political power. National vote shares show domestic reach; parliamentary seats and coalition agreements determine access to government; EU unanimity rules can give a single government a veto. None of these is interchangeable with the number of party logos on a conference poster.

The atlas uses national parliamentary elections, not presidential contests, regional victories or opinion polls. France’s first-round party labels, Dutch proportional votes and Swiss party-strength figures come from different electoral systems; their percentages can be compared as indicators of reach but cannot be added into a European vote share. A coalition result is marked as such and is not assigned in full to every constituent party.

Power can also reverse. Fidesz’s record of obstruction while governing Hungary remains relevant, but it must be described historically after the 2026 change of government. Similarly, a party leaving a coalition does not erase its past decisions. The status and date alongside each entry prevent yesterday’s governing influence from being presented as today’s. popu-list.org

Three routes by which Moscow benefits

The first route is policy convergence. Ending weapons deliveries, lifting sanctions or accepting territorial conquest would improve Russia’s position even without a secret payment. AfD’s 2025 programme is a clear example: it calls for sanctions to end, Nord Stream to be restored and Ukraine to remain outside NATO and the EU. These are published political demands, so their consequences can be assessed directly.

The second route is access: loans, cooperation agreements, political visits and recurring conferences create relationships through which messages and interests circulate. The third is covert influence: concealed media funding and networks that investigators or sanctions authorities identify as instruments of interference. Evidence of the third route must be established case by case; the existence of the first two does not automatically prove it.

This distinction makes the analysis stronger. A party’s conduct can weaken Ukraine without the party being a Russian agent. Conversely, an openly acknowledged loan or agreement is harder to dismiss than an unsupported allegation that every critic of aid is on the Kremlin’s payroll. afd.de lorientlejour.com newsv2.orf.at consilium.europa.eu justice.gov

The meetings: who gathered, where and for what purpose?

The network did not begin in 2022. A private meeting in Vienna in May 2014 brought together Russian conservative intermediaries and figures from the French, Austrian and Bulgarian right. In March 2015, Rodina’s St Petersburg forum provided a public platform for ultranationalists and neo-Nazis. Later came formal agreements with United Russia: FPÖ in December 2016 and Lega in March 2017.

The distinction between these events matters. The 2018 Metropol discussion concerned a proposed oil-financing scheme; the investigation was subsequently shelved without establishing a completed transaction. The 2024 creation of Patriots for Europe and its 2025 Madrid summit were public European party-building events. They demonstrate political cooperation, but attendance at them is not evidence of Kremlin direction. The chronology identifies the participants and the type of relationship instead of presenting every meeting as the same conspiracy. lemonde.fr osw.waw.pl newsv2.orf.at ansa.it ansa.it ansa.it ots.at eunews.it patriots.eu

St Petersburg, 22 March 2015: the contradiction in plain sight

A British diplomatic report released under freedom-of-information rules lists representatives from nine European countries: Sweden, Spain, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Belgium, Greece and the United Kingdom. It names Nick Griffin and Jim Dowson as the British participants and notes that France’s National Front was absent. US white nationalists Jared Taylor and Sam Dickson were also reported at the gathering. These were party figures and activists, not delegations representing their countries’ governments.

Among the identifiable organisations were Germany’s NPD, Greece’s Golden Dawn, Italy’s Forza Nuova and Bulgaria’s Ataka. Griffin was a former BNP leader who had already been expelled; describing his presence as an official BNP delegation would be inaccurate. Nor should NPD attendance be silently reassigned to AfD, or Swedish extremists to the Sweden Democrats.

The organiser was Rodina’s St Petersburg branch. Contemporary reporting said the Kremlin had neither formally endorsed nor condemned the forum. The documented paradox is nevertheless stark: a gathering promoting cooperation with Russia and opposition to sanctions welcomed openly extremist forces while Russian officials used accusations of fascism to delegitimise Ukraine. The forum was not an official summit of the Russian government, and its largely marginal participants were not a census of Europe’s entire right. assets.publishing.service.gov.uk osw.waw.pl themoscowtimes.com splcenter.org rferl.org

Three countries, different forms of influence

Ukraine illustrates why electoral support and influence must be separated. In 2019, the joint Svoboda list, which included Right Sector and National Corps candidates, won 2.15%. That is one result, not three percentages to add together. Research subsequently recorded wartime suspension of political activity. The old vote therefore cannot measure their social reach or the strength of military units with historical personnel links.

Russia presents a different setting. LDPR is a legal parliamentary party: its systemic opposition coexists with support for Putin’s war. The Russian Imperial Movement and Rusich are armed extremist actors, not comparable electoral competitors. Sources document the Imperial Legion’s and Rusich’s participation alongside Russian forces. Parliamentary access, organisational autonomy and a role in violence must be examined separately rather than placed in one ranking.

In the United States, Proud Boys and Oath Keepers cannot stand for the Republican Party or the MAGA constituency. Trump’s January 2025 clemency and subsequent court dismissals are documented decisions affecting individuals; they do not establish organisational command. Across these cases, institutional access and geopolitical alignment matter more than a simple headcount. Far-right classification alone neither proves Kremlin loyalty nor predicts a common position on Ukraine.

The contradiction extends beyond a conference room

US Treasury sanctions of 15 September 2022 described Rusich as a neo-Nazi paramilitary group fighting alongside Russia’s military in Ukraine. In April 2020, the US designated the Russian Imperial Movement and leaders under its global-terrorism sanctions authority; subsequent Treasury action described fundraising that supported Russian fighters in Ukraine. These official findings undermine any simple claim that Moscow’s war represents a consistent campaign against the far right.

They do not make all European nationalists neo-Nazis. The relevant finding is narrower and more concrete: Russian state rhetoric about ‘denazification’ coexists with cooperation or operational alignment involving documented far-right extremists. That is a contradiction in conduct, not merely a dispute about labels. home.treasury.gov 2017-2021.state.gov home.treasury.gov

A proven bribery case: Nathan Gill

On 21 November 2025, a British court sentenced former MEP Nathan Gill to 10½ years after guilty pleas to eight bribery counts concerning December 2018–July 2019. The judge identified Viktor Medvedchuk as the ultimate source of requests and money, passed through Oleg Voloshyn. Gill delivered scripted statements and recruited other MEPs; the judge expressly did not establish that those colleagues knew of his payments. This is a conviction, not merely an allegation. Gill later briefly led Reform UK in Wales; the case does not establish that the whole party or Nigel Farage received these payments. judiciary.uk

Follow the money — and keep the units separate

The French National Front’s €9.4 million loan from the First Czech-Russian Bank in 2014 created a documented financial relationship. RN announced repayment in September 2023. That is a real historical connection, not evidence of a debt still outstanding today. FPÖ’s and Lega’s agreements with United Russia were political arrangements; their existence should not be converted into an invented payment total.

The 2024 US case against two RT employees described an alleged operation directing nearly $10 million through intermediaries into an American online-content company. Prosecutors reported almost 2,000 videos and more than 16 million YouTube views. Those figures describe alleged funding and distribution, not the number of persuaded voters. In Europe, the Council’s May 2024 sanctions decision described Voice of Europe as a vehicle for paying propagandists and building influence over representatives of political parties.

A separate US intelligence assessment made public in September 2022 estimated at least $300 million in covert Russian political financing abroad since 2014. It covered countries and political forces beyond Europe’s far right. Russia’s planned 2025 mass-media budget of 137.2 billion roubles is yet another category: public media spending, not a ledger of covert payments. Adding these amounts would double-count or combine incompatible scopes and currencies.

Ukraine faces a substantial information challenge, but it is incorrect to say that it has no international broadcasting: UATV exists. The more useful question is how reach, distribution and covert sponsorship differ. There is no audited, like-for-like Russia-versus-Ukraine propaganda budget in these sources, so this article does not manufacture a ratio. lorientlejour.com justice.gov consilium.europa.eu 2021-2025.state.gov sipri.org uatv.ua

The Polish test: sovereignty for whom?

For readers in Poland, the substantive issue is what a party’s programme would do to security east of the EU. Shared positions on migration or criticism of Brussels do not establish shared interests on Russia. AfD’s demands concerning sanctions, Nord Stream and Ukraine’s alliances must be weighed against Poland’s own security debate, independently of applause for any individual election result.

Poland’s right is itself divided. PiS-led governments delivered weapons to Ukraine; disputes about agricultural imports, historical memory or accession conditions do not erase that record. Konfederacja and its constituent or former constituent currents require separate treatment, particularly after organisational splits. The atlas marks the common 2023 electoral result so that it is not counted several times. Neither Polish society nor the Polish right can be represented by a handful of celebratory social-media posts.

The counterexamples elsewhere are equally substantive: Meloni’s government signed a security agreement with Ukraine, and Nordic right-wing parties have backed military support. Their existence does not cancel the networks and obstruction documented here. It shows that ideology alone does not predict foreign policy; geography, threat perception, coalition commitments and electoral strategy also matter. afd.de gov.pl ambkiev.esteri.it

Alternative for Germany’s victory in the September 6, 2026 election was for the parliament of Saxony-Anhalt. It is an important regional result, but not a victory in a Bundestag election or a takeover of power across Germany. The distinction matters: a state parliamentary election result does not give the party sole control over German foreign policy. Election results — Saxony-Anhalt electoral authority; AP report.

There was no single reaction to this result in Poland. Jacek Wilk of the Confederation of the Polish Crown welcomed it. Zdzisław Krasnodębski called for an end to AfD’s isolation. Criticism, however, came not only from Donald Tusk, but also from Anna Zalewska of PiS and the head of the president’s cabinet, Paweł Szefernaker. The latter pointed to the party’s pro-Russian proposals. These examples reveal divisions on the political right as well; they do not support claims of widespread enthusiasm among Poles. Compilation of statements: Notes from Poland.

Offensive remarks: the speaker and context matter

The expression “the African Americans of Europe” recurs in this dispute. It is attributed to Fabian Keubel, an AfD activist and former member of the leadership of its youth wing in Saxony. According to a Polish Radio report of August 4, 2026, he used it in the context of commemorating the victims of the Warsaw Uprising in Berlin. The report also describes his mockery of Polish historical memory and demands for reparations. Polish Radio.

Accuracy requires two qualifications. The wording was “the African Americans of Europe”, not “the Africans of Europe”. It is a statement by a particular activist, not a quotation from the party’s programme. Keubel is not a member of the Bundestag. Attributing these words to all AfD members would be an unjustified generalisation. Criticism of the remark concerns the use of a comparison to demean two communities, not the name of an ethnic group itself.

The danger does not require a single command centre

The evidence establishes a durable set of Russian connections and a large bloc resisting stronger support for Ukraine. It also establishes a split. The most defensible conclusion is not that every far-right party has been bought, but that parts of this political family repeatedly advance policies that reduce the cost of Russian aggression — sometimes through documented relationships, sometimes through their own political choices.

That distinction changes what should be monitored: votes on arms and finance, sanctions policy, coalition agreements, disclosed borrowing and investigated money flows. A conference photograph shows access; a signed pact shows a relationship; a financial record shows a transaction; a parliamentary vote shows a decision. Together they provide a stronger account of influence than either a blanket accusation or the claim that these contacts are politically meaningless.

How to read this investigation

The directory includes only organisations classified by the cited sources as far right, covering both radical-right and extreme-right currents; borderline cases and parties classified only as conservative are excluded. The PopuList 4.0 classifications refer to their own coverage periods, distinct from the stated election and government-status dates. Newer or non-parliamentary groups outside its core scope require separate source-based classification. Votes for alliances and their component parties must not be added together. “Unknown” means insufficient verified evidence, not neutrality. The European Parliament figure of 60% concerns ECR, PfE and ESN in one specified vote: it is neither a census of all far-right parties nor proof of external control.

AI use disclosure. Draft text — AI assisted research, drafting, translation and visualisation. Sources and dates are provided; uncertainty and the limits of each comparison are stated. The publication's policy

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