Sovereignty for whom? How parts of the Western right help Moscow
From votes in Washington and Brussels to Russian loans and a British bribery conviction: the same political fault line takes different forms. The evidence reveals a powerful current against support for Ukraine — alongside a right that sees Russia as the threat.

Updated 21 September 2026 · Every election and event is dated
For the Kremlin, a useful ally need not fly a Russian flag. A party can condemn the invasion and still oppose the weapons, financing or sanctions that make resistance possible. That is the central contradiction in part of Europe’s radical right: defending sovereignty at home while seeking to restrict the means by which Ukraine defends its own. Yet the evidence also identifies a substantial Atlanticist wing. Treating the two as identical obscures where Moscow actually gains influence.
90 out of 150 did not back the Ukraine resolution
European Parliament, 24 February 2026. ECR, Patriots for Europe and ESN combined; only MEPs who cast a vote. This counts one resolution, not allegiance to Russia.
For: 51 · Against: 2 · Abstained: 6 · Did not vote: 20
For: 8 · Against: 21 · Abstained: 39 · Did not vote: 16
For: 1 · Against: 22 · Abstained: 0 · Did not vote: 5
Across the whole Parliament: 437 for, 82 against, 70 abstentions. The resolution passed. Percentages within each bar exclude non-voters.
What “far right” means here
“Far right” is a research umbrella for the radical and extreme right. The radical right accepts elections but challenges liberal safeguards such as minority rights and pluralism. The extreme right rejects democracy itself; some organisations also legitimise political violence. Classification rests on documented ideology and conduct, with sources and dates. Conservatism, patriotism, national identity or support for national defence alone do not qualify.
This directory distinguishes legal parties, civil movements and paramilitary groups. Their votes, membership, armed strength and online reach are not interchangeable measures. Shared lists are counted once; missing figures mean unverified or inapplicable, not zero. Historical links do not automatically classify a present military unit or an entire country. US movements do not stand for all Republicans; Russian groups do not stand for all Russians. Inclusion does not imply a common position on Ukraine or Kremlin funding.
Far right: parties and movements
57 ProfilesA sourced selection of far-right parties, civil movements and paramilitary groups. Electoral results are dated; movements have no comparable vote share. Unknown is not neutral. Updated 22 September 2026.
Tap a tile for details and sources
No matching parties
Germany2
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderAlice WeidelAfD co-chair

AfD co-chair
Political statusOpposition
Federal opposition. · Checked: 2026-09-21
Russia: sanctionsOpposes
2025 manifesto: end sanctions, restore Nord Stream, exclude Ukraine from NATO/EU. Leadership visits to Moscow are documented.
Ukraine: military aidOpposes
2025 manifesto: end sanctions, restore Nord Stream, exclude Ukraine from NATO/EU. Leadership visits to Moscow are documented.
European UnionReplace the EU model
2025 programme proposes a new union of European nations.
United StatesUnassessed
No comprehensive current US policy established in this review.
Electoral change↑ +10.4 ppBundestag election · second-vote share (%) · 2021-09-26 → 2025-02-23
Bundestag election · second-vote share (%) · 2021-09-26 → 2025-02-23
ForEnding Russia sanctions; restoring economic ties; Ukrainian neutrality outside alliances.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. 2025 manifesto: end sanctions, restore Nord Stream, exclude Ukraine from NATO/EU. Leadership visits to Moscow are documented.
AgainstArms deliveries to Ukraine; Ukrainian membership of NATO and EU.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. 2025 manifesto: end sanctions, restore Nord Stream, exclude Ukraine from NATO/EU. Leadership visits to Moscow are documented.
Selected facts
Public supportMusk backed AfD2025-01-09
Elon Musk hosted AfD co-leader Alice Weidel in a live conversation on X and urged Germans to vote for the party ahead of the February 2025 election.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. 2025 manifesto: end sanctions, restore Nord Stream, exclude Ukraine from NATO/EU. Leadership visits to Moscow are documented.
Die Heimat (formerly NPD)
Outside parliamentPolitical statusNo seats
Outside the Bundestag; verified 2025 result. · Checked: 2025-02-23
Russia: sanctionsNot established
2024 court ruling excluded public funding for six years, not the party itself. November 2024 resolution rejects Taurus and other offensive arms; full sanctions policy unverified.
Ukraine: military aidMixed / conditional
2024 court ruling excluded public funding for six years, not the party itself. November 2024 resolution rejects Taurus and other offensive arms; full sanctions policy unverified.
European UnionNot established
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. 2024 court ruling excluded public funding for six years, not the party itself. November 2024 resolution rejects Taurus and other offensive arms; full sanctions policy unverified.
AgainstTaurus and other offensive weapons for Ukraine; November 2024 resolution.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. 2024 court ruling excluded public funding for six years, not the party itself. November 2024 resolution rejects Taurus and other offensive arms; full sanctions policy unverified.
Details
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. 2024 court ruling excluded public funding for six years, not the party itself. November 2024 resolution rejects Taurus and other offensive arms; full sanctions policy unverified.
France2
Rassemblement national (RN)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderJordan BardellaParty chair

Party chair
Sources
Political statusOpposition
Opposition. · Checked: 2026-09-21
Russia: sanctionsMixed / conditional
2014 Russian bank loan, repaid in 2023. Supports aid with restrictions; September 2026 statements combine criticism of further financing with condemnation of Russian intimidation.
Ukraine: military aidMixed / conditional
2014 Russian bank loan, repaid in 2023. Supports aid with restrictions; September 2026 statements combine criticism of further financing with condemnation of Russian intimidation.
European UnionReform / sovereignty
The 2024 European programme promotes a Europe of nations and greater national control over EU decisions.
Sources
United StatesEuropean interests first
On 15 September 2026, RN opposed US pressure to relax preferences for European businesses in EU funding.
Electoral change↑ +8.03 ppEuropean Parliament election · party vote share (%) · 2019-05-26 → 2024-06-09
European Parliament election · party vote share (%) · 2019-05-26 → 2024-06-09
ForConditional military aid; national sovereignty; European defence procurement and autonomy.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. 2014 Russian bank loan, repaid in 2023. Supports aid with restrictions; September 2026 statements combine criticism of further financing with condemnation of Russian intimidation.
AgainstFixed Ukraine spending commitments; lifting restrictions on strikes inside Russia.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. 2014 Russian bank loan, repaid in 2023. Supports aid with restrictions; September 2026 statements combine criticism of further financing with condemnation of Russian intimidation.
Selected facts
Political contactsRN announced Russian loan repayment2023-09-19
RN announced early repayment of the remaining €6,088,784, including interest, on its €9.4 million loan taken from First Czech-Russian Bank in 2014. The debt had passed to the Russian company Aviazapchast.
Public supportTrump defended Le Pen after the verdict2025-04-03
Donald Trump publicly backed Marine Le Pen after her 31 March 2025 first-instance conviction for embezzling EU funds, portraying the case as political persecution. Le Pen had announced plans to appeal; this dated episode does not establish the later appeal outcome.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. 2014 Russian bank loan, repaid in 2023. Supports aid with restrictions; September 2026 statements combine criticism of further financing with condemnation of Russian intimidation.
Reconquête!
Outside parliament
LeaderÉric ZemmourParty chair
Political statusNo seats
Outside the National Assembly; represented in the European Parliament. · Checked: 2026-09-22
Russia: sanctionsMixed / conditional
Knafo's November 2024 explanation objects to long-range missiles and further sanctions. A dated MEP position, not rejection of all aid.
Ukraine: military aidMixed / conditional
Knafo's November 2024 explanation objects to long-range missiles and further sanctions. A dated MEP position, not rejection of all aid.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Knafo's November 2024 explanation objects to long-range missiles and further sanctions. A dated MEP position, not rejection of all aid.
AgainstLong-range missiles; further sanctions without cost assessment: Knafo, November 2024.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Knafo's November 2024 explanation objects to long-range missiles and further sanctions. A dated MEP position, not rejection of all aid.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Knafo's November 2024 explanation objects to long-range missiles and further sanctions. A dated MEP position, not rejection of all aid.
Austria1
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderHerbert KicklParty chair

Party chair
Sources
Political statusOpposition
Russia: sanctionsOpposes
February–March 2026 statements oppose weapons/funding and seek sanctions relief. Signed a United Russia pact in 2016; present validity is not established.
Ukraine: military aidOpposes
February–March 2026 statements oppose weapons/funding and seek sanctions relief. Signed a United Russia pact in 2016; present validity is not established.
European UnionReform / sovereignty
The party programme supports European cooperation while giving sovereign states’ constitutional principles priority over EU law.
Sources
United StatesCooperation on trade
In April 2025, its foreign-policy spokesperson called for negotiations with the US rather than retaliatory tariffs.
Electoral change↑ +12.6 ppNational lower-house election · party vote share (%) · 2019-09-29 → 2024-09-29
National lower-house election · party vote share (%) · 2019-09-29 → 2024-09-29
ForAustrian neutrality; national sovereignty; easing economic sanctions imposed on Russia.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. February–March 2026 statements oppose weapons/funding and seek sanctions relief. Signed a United Russia pact in 2016; present validity is not established.
AgainstFurther weapons deliveries and additional funding commitments benefiting Ukraine.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. February–March 2026 statements oppose weapons/funding and seek sanctions relief. Signed a United Russia pact in 2016; present validity is not established.
Selected facts
Political contactsA pact with United Russia2016-12-19
FPÖ signed a cooperation agreement with United Russia in Moscow. Heinz-Christian Strache and Norbert Hofer attended the ceremony. This documents a formal party relationship; the agreement alone is not evidence of a Russian payment.
Sources
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. February–March 2026 statements oppose weapons/funding and seek sanctions relief. Signed a United Russia pact in 2016; present validity is not established.
Italy2
Fratelli d'Italia (FdI)
In government
LeaderGiorgia MeloniParty chair

Party chair
Sources
Political statusGovernment
Leads Meloni government. · Checked: 2026-09-21
Russia: sanctionsSupports
Meloni reaffirmed defence support and the EU twentieth sanctions package in June 2026. A substantial counterexample to blanket pro-Russia claims.
Ukraine: military aidSupports
Meloni reaffirmed defence support and the EU twentieth sanctions package in June 2026. A substantial counterexample to blanket pro-Russia claims.
European UnionReform / sovereignty
The 2024 European programme favours a Europe of peoples and nations over a European superstate.
Sources
United StatesUS alliance
In April 2026, its parliamentary leaders reaffirmed the US alliance while defending Italy’s right to disagree with Washington.
Electoral change↑ +22.31 ppEuropean Parliament election · party vote share (%) · 2019-05-26 → 2024-06-09
European Parliament election · party vote share (%) · 2019-05-26 → 2024-06-09
ForUkrainian defence; pressure on Moscow; European sanctions; alliance with Washington.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Meloni reaffirmed defence support and the EU twentieth sanctions package in June 2026. A substantial counterexample to blanket pro-Russia claims.
AgainstRussian aggression; an EU superstate overriding sovereign European nations.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Meloni reaffirmed defence support and the EU twentieth sanctions package in June 2026. A substantial counterexample to blanket pro-Russia claims.
Selected facts
CounterexampleMeloni signed a security pact with Ukraine2024-02-24
Giorgia Meloni signed a ten-year security cooperation agreement with Ukraine in Kyiv. It commits Italy to continued support, including military equipment and weapons within its capabilities and national law—a concrete counterexample to treating all far-right parties as opponents of aid.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Meloni reaffirmed defence support and the EU twentieth sanctions package in June 2026. A substantial counterexample to blanket pro-Russia claims.
Lega
In government
LeaderMatteo SalviniFederal secretary of Lega

Federal secretary of Lega
Political statusGovernment
Junior governing partner. · Checked: 2026-09-21
Russia: sanctionsMixed / conditional
Signed United Russia pact in 2017, disavowed in 2024. Accepted January 2026 aid measure with defensive priorities; Salvini criticised sanctions in July.
Ukraine: military aidMixed / conditional
Signed United Russia pact in 2017, disavowed in 2024. Accepted January 2026 aid measure with defensive priorities; Salvini criticised sanctions in July.
European UnionReform / sovereignty
Its 2024 European campaign calls for more national influence and less power for EU institutions.
Sources
United StatesAlliance: 2022 programme
The 2022 manifesto explicitly describes the US as a firm ally; this is dated programme evidence, not endorsement of every later US decision.
Electoral change↓ -25.29 ppEuropean Parliament election · party vote share (%) · 2019-05-26 → 2024-06-09
European Parliament election · party vote share (%) · 2019-05-26 → 2024-06-09
ForDefensive Ukraine aid; civilian protection; logistics; stronger Italian national control.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Signed United Russia pact in 2017, disavowed in 2024. Accepted January 2026 aid measure with defensive priorities; Salvini criticised sanctions in July.
AgainstSuccessive Russia sanctions packages; further concentration of powers in Brussels.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Signed United Russia pact in 2017, disavowed in 2024. Accepted January 2026 aid measure with defensive priorities; Salvini criticised sanctions in July.
Selected facts
Court caseFunding investigation closed2023-04-27
A Milan judge closed the Metropol investigation into alleged Russian funding for Lega. The judge described an unfulfilled plan to finance the party, but no crime was proved and the oil deal did not take place. The case does not establish that Lega received the proposed money.
Sources
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Signed United Russia pact in 2017, disavowed in 2024. Accepted January 2026 aid measure with defensive priorities; Salvini criticised sanctions in July.
Spain1
Vox
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderSantiago AbascalParty chair

Party chair
Sources
Political statusOpposition
Russia: sanctionsSupports
Party statements support military equipment and sanctions, with limits on intervention. Joining Patriots in 2024 does not prove a reversal of every Ukraine policy.
Ukraine: military aidSupports
Party statements support military equipment and sanctions, with limits on intervention. Joining Patriots in 2024 does not prove a reversal of every Ukraine policy.
European UnionReform / sovereignty
The 2024 European programme demands national sovereignty and limits on Brussels’ powers.
Sources
United StatesCooperation on trade
In April 2025, Vox called US tariffs harmful but advocated negotiations with Washington as an economic ally.
Electoral change↑ +3.35 ppEuropean Parliament election · party vote share (%) · 2019-05-26 → 2024-06-09
European Parliament election · party vote share (%) · 2019-05-26 → 2024-06-09
ForMilitary equipment for Ukraine; Russia sanctions; a Europe of nations.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Party statements support military equipment and sanctions, with limits on intervention. Joining Patriots in 2024 does not prove a reversal of every Ukraine policy.
AgainstUnlimited military intervention; Russian gas purchases; excessive EU centralisation.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Party statements support military equipment and sanctions, with limits on intervention. Joining Patriots in 2024 does not prove a reversal of every Ukraine policy.
Selected facts
Political contactsAbascal and Milei at CPAC2026-03-21
Vox reported that Santiago Abascal and Argentina’s Javier Milei spoke at CPAC Budapest’s closing session; Abascal also met Orbán privately. This documents political contacts, not shared financing.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Party statements support military equipment and sanctions, with limits on intervention. Joining Patriots in 2024 does not prove a reversal of every Ukraine policy.
Portugal1
Chega
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderAndré VenturaParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Ventura supported use of supplied weapons against targets in Russia in May 2024. No current comprehensive sanctions position established in this review.
Ukraine: military aidSupports
Ventura supported use of supplied weapons against targets in Russia in May 2024. No current comprehensive sanctions position established in this review.
European UnionNot established
ForUkraine striking Russian targets with European-supplied weapons; Ventura, May 2024.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Ventura supported use of supplied weapons against targets in Russia in May 2024. No current comprehensive sanctions position established in this review.
AgainstInsufficient verified evidence for a concise opposition summary; unknown is not neutrality.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Ventura supported use of supplied weapons against targets in Russia in May 2024. No current comprehensive sanctions position established in this review.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Ventura supported use of supplied weapons against targets in Russia in May 2024. No current comprehensive sanctions position established in this review.
Netherlands3
Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderGeert WildersPVV parliamentary leader

PVV parliamentary leader
Sources
Political statusOpposition
Russia: sanctionsNot established
2025 manifesto recognises Russian aggression and supports Ukraine, while demanding a reduced Dutch burden. Moscow contacts are documented; party financing by Russia is not established here.
Ukraine: military aidMixed / conditional
2025 manifesto recognises Russian aggression and supports Ukraine, while demanding a reduced Dutch burden. Moscow contacts are documented; party financing by Russia is not established here.
European UnionReform / sovereignty
The 2025 programme rejects a European superstate and demands lower Dutch payments to the EU.
United StatesNot verified
The reviewed 2025 programme does not specify a US policy; this check does not establish a current party-wide position.
ForUkraine support with greater foreign burden-sharing and Dutch domestic spending.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. 2025 manifesto recognises Russian aggression and supports Ukraine, while demanding a reduced Dutch burden. Moscow contacts are documented; party financing by Russia is not established here.
AgainstAn EU superstate; high Dutch contributions to the European budget.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. 2025 manifesto recognises Russian aggression and supports Ukraine, while demanding a reduced Dutch burden. Moscow contacts are documented; party financing by Russia is not established here.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. 2025 manifesto recognises Russian aggression and supports Ukraine, while demanding a reduced Dutch burden. Moscow contacts are documented; party financing by Russia is not established here.
Forum voor Democratie (FvD)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderLidewij de VosParty leader
Political statusOpposition
Russia: sanctionsOpposes
Party programme rejects Ukraine-war spending and calls for lifting Russia sanctions. Contacts with Russian figures are documented; direction or payment was not proved in the cited reporting.
Ukraine: military aidOpposes
Party programme rejects Ukraine-war spending and calls for lifting Russia sanctions. Contacts with Russian figures are documented; direction or payment was not proved in the cited reporting.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForNormalising relations with Russia through the lifting of economic sanctions.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Party programme rejects Ukraine-war spending and calls for lifting Russia sanctions. Contacts with Russian figures are documented; direction or payment was not proved in the cited reporting.
AgainstSpending on the Ukraine war and maintaining economic sanctions against Russia.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Party programme rejects Ukraine-war spending and calls for lifting Russia sanctions. Contacts with Russian figures are documented; direction or payment was not proved in the cited reporting.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Party programme rejects Ukraine-war spending and calls for lifting Russia sanctions. Contacts with Russian figures are documented; direction or payment was not proved in the cited reporting.
JA21
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderJoost EerdmansParty leader
Political statusOpposition
Russia: sanctionsNot established
2025 programme supports Ukraine’s independence but rejects EU/NATO accession. This is support with limits; a complete sanctions position was not established.
Ukraine: military aidSupports
2025 programme supports Ukraine’s independence but rejects EU/NATO accession. This is support with limits; a complete sanctions position was not established.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForContinued support for Ukrainian independence; specific weapons commitments remain qualified.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. 2025 programme supports Ukraine’s independence but rejects EU/NATO accession. This is support with limits; a complete sanctions position was not established.
AgainstUkrainian accession to NATO and the European Union; 2025 programme.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. 2025 programme supports Ukraine’s independence but rejects EU/NATO accession. This is support with limits; a complete sanctions position was not established.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. 2025 programme supports Ukraine’s independence but rejects EU/NATO accession. This is support with limits; a complete sanctions position was not established.
Belgium1
Vlaams Belang (VB)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderTom Van GriekenParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Federal opposition. · Checked: 2026-09-21
Russia: sanctionsMixed / conditional
Supported defensive arms but opposed F-16 transfers in 2023. Advocated targeted sanctions in 2022. Three party politicians observed the 2014 Crimea referendum.
Ukraine: military aidMixed / conditional
Supported defensive arms but opposed F-16 transfers in 2023. Advocated targeted sanctions in 2022. Three party politicians observed the 2014 Crimea referendum.
European UnionNot established
Not established
United StatesNot established
Not established
ForDefensive weapons for Ukraine; targeted sanctions against those responsible for invasion.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Supported defensive arms but opposed F-16 transfers in 2023. Advocated targeted sanctions in 2022. Three party politicians observed the 2014 Crimea referendum.
AgainstF-16 transfers; costs weakening Belgian defence capacity, according to 2023 statement.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Supported defensive arms but opposed F-16 transfers in 2023. Advocated targeted sanctions in 2022. Three party politicians observed the 2014 Crimea referendum.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Supported defensive arms but opposed F-16 transfers in 2023. Advocated targeted sanctions in 2022. Three party politicians observed the 2014 Crimea referendum.
Poland5
Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderSławomir MentzenCo-chair of the leadership council (22 September 2026)

Co-chair of the leadership council (22 September 2026)
Sources
Political statusOpposition
Opposition; electoral umbrella. · Checked: 2025-11-21
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Mentzen opposed a specific US weapons purchase in 2025 and advocated conditional aid. The umbrella contains different currents; no common current sanctions line established.
Ukraine: military aidMixed / conditional
Mentzen opposed a specific US weapons purchase in 2025 and advocated conditional aid. The umbrella contains different currents; no common current sanctions line established.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForAid conditional on Polish demands, according to Mentzen’s March 2025 statement.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Mentzen opposed a specific US weapons purchase in 2025 and advocated conditional aid. The umbrella contains different currents; no common current sanctions line established.
AgainstThe $100 million Ukraine arms purchase; Mentzen’s November 2025 criticism.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Mentzen opposed a specific US weapons purchase in 2025 and advocated conditional aid. The umbrella contains different currents; no common current sanctions line established.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Mentzen opposed a specific US weapons purchase in 2025 and advocated conditional aid. The umbrella contains different currents; no common current sanctions line established.
Nowa Nadzieja (New Hope)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderSławomir MentzenParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Opposition; Konfederacja component. · Checked: 2025-11-21
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Mentzen’s criticism of arms spending establishes a restrictive, conditional position. It is not a separate national electoral result.
Ukraine: military aidMixed / conditional
Mentzen’s criticism of arms spending establishes a restrictive, conditional position. It is not a separate national electoral result.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForAid conditional on Polish demands, according to Mentzen’s March 2025 statement.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Mentzen’s criticism of arms spending establishes a restrictive, conditional position. It is not a separate national electoral result.
AgainstThe $100 million Ukraine arms purchase; Mentzen’s November 2025 criticism.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Mentzen’s criticism of arms spending establishes a restrictive, conditional position. It is not a separate national electoral result.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Mentzen’s criticism of arms spending establishes a restrictive, conditional position. It is not a separate national electoral result.
Ruch Narodowy (National Movement)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderKrzysztof BosakParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Opposition; Konfederacja component. · Checked: 2025-02-20
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Opposition to sending Polish troops is not itself opposition to weapons deliveries. Separate current aid and sanctions policies were not established in this review.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
Opposition to sending Polish troops is not itself opposition to weapons deliveries. Separate current aid and sanctions policies were not established in this review.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Opposition to sending Polish troops is not itself opposition to weapons deliveries. Separate current aid and sanctions policies were not established in this review.
AgainstInsufficient verified evidence for a concise opposition summary; unknown is not neutrality.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Opposition to sending Polish troops is not itself opposition to weapons deliveries. Separate current aid and sanctions policies were not established in this review.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Opposition to sending Polish troops is not itself opposition to weapons deliveries. Separate current aid and sanctions policies were not established in this review.
Konfederacja Korony Polskiej (Confederation of the Polish Crown)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderGrzegorz BraunParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Opposition; separate Sejm circle. · Checked: 2026-09-17
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Braun’s 2025 presidential programme opposed further aid and sought a new opening with Russia. This is leadership-programme evidence; it does not establish a separate 2023 vote share.
Ukraine: military aidOpposes
Braun’s 2025 presidential programme opposed further aid and sought a new opening with Russia. This is leadership-programme evidence; it does not establish a separate 2023 vote share.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Braun’s 2025 presidential programme opposed further aid and sought a new opening with Russia. This is leadership-programme evidence; it does not establish a separate 2023 vote share.
AgainstWeapons, ammunition and troops for Ukraine; Braun’s 2025 presidential programme.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Braun’s 2025 presidential programme opposed further aid and sought a new opening with Russia. This is leadership-programme evidence; it does not establish a separate 2023 vote share.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Braun’s 2025 presidential programme opposed further aid and sought a new opening with Russia. This is leadership-programme evidence; it does not establish a separate 2023 vote share.
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderJarosław KaczyńskiParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Opposition; broad/contested classification. · Checked: 2026-09-21
Russia: sanctionsSupports
PiS governments delivered weapons; Morawiecki defended that record in July 2026. Published support for sanctions dates to 2022; disputes with Kyiv do not erase the aid record.
Ukraine: military aidSupports
PiS governments delivered weapons; Morawiecki defended that record in July 2026. Published support for sanctions dates to 2022; disputes with Kyiv do not erase the aid record.
European UnionReform / sovereignty
In September 2025, Kaczyński reaffirmed EU membership while rejecting a centralised European state.
United StatesUS alliance
In September 2025, Kaczyński supported a security system combining sovereign states with US power.
ForMilitary aid for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia; dated qualifications apply.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. PiS governments delivered weapons; Morawiecki defended that record in July 2026. Published support for sanctions dates to 2022; disputes with Kyiv do not erase the aid record.
AgainstInsufficient verified evidence for a concise opposition summary; unknown is not neutrality.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. PiS governments delivered weapons; Morawiecki defended that record in July 2026. Published support for sanctions dates to 2022; disputes with Kyiv do not erase the aid record.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. PiS governments delivered weapons; Morawiecki defended that record in July 2026. Published support for sanctions dates to 2022; disputes with Kyiv do not erase the aid record.
Hungary2
Fidesz
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderViktor OrbánParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Opposition after April 2026 election. · Checked: 2026-05-12
Sources
Russia: sanctionsMixed / conditional
In government, refused direct arms supplies. Sanctions record includes obstruction and exemptions as well as eventual approvals. Do not present Orbán’s former veto power as current.
Sources
Ukraine: military aidOpposes
In government, refused direct arms supplies. Sanctions record includes obstruction and exemptions as well as eventual approvals. Do not present Orbán’s former veto power as current.
Sources
European UnionReform from within
Orbán stated an aim to change EU leadership, not leave the EU.
United StatesTrump contacts
White House meeting on 07.11.2025; not endorsement of every US policy.
ForRussian energy exemptions; negotiated sanctions decisions protecting Hungarian supply interests.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. In government, refused direct arms supplies. Sanctions record includes obstruction and exemptions as well as eventual approvals. Do not present Orbán’s former veto power as current.
Sources
AgainstDirect weapons deliveries to Ukraine, according to its governing record.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. In government, refused direct arms supplies. Sanctions record includes obstruction and exemptions as well as eventual approvals. Do not present Orbán’s former veto power as current.
Sources
Selected facts
Public supportTrump endorsed Orbán2026-02-05
Donald Trump publicly endorsed Viktor Orbán for re-election ahead of Hungary’s April 2026 election. This records an endorsement, not an election result.
Sources
Political contactsA meeting at the White House2025-11-07
Trump received Orbán at the White House for bilateral talks and a working lunch. The official White House record documents direct contact between the two leaders.
Sources
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. In government, refused direct arms supplies. Sanctions record includes obstruction and exemptions as well as eventual approvals. Do not present Orbán’s former veto power as current.
Sources
Mi Hazánk Mozgalom (Our Homeland)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderLászló ToroczkaiParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Russia: sanctionsOpposes
Party publications reject economic sanctions and budget spending for Ukraine’s war aims. The source concerns Hungarian funding and participation.
Ukraine: military aidOpposes
Party publications reject economic sanctions and budget spending for Ukraine’s war aims. The source concerns Hungarian funding and participation.
European UnionNot established
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Party publications reject economic sanctions and budget spending for Ukraine’s war aims. The source concerns Hungarian funding and participation.
AgainstTraining Ukrainian military personnel in Hungary; economic sanctions against Russia.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Party publications reject economic sanctions and budget spending for Ukraine’s war aims. The source concerns Hungarian funding and participation.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Party publications reject economic sanctions and budget spending for Ukraine’s war aims. The source concerns Hungarian funding and participation.
Czechia1
Svoboda a přímá demokracie (SPD)
In government
LeaderTomio OkamuraParty chair
Political statusGovernment
Governing coalition partner. · Checked: 2026-07-08
Sources
Russia: sanctionsOpposes
Opposed PURL weapons funding in July 2026 and previously Russia sanctions. Coalition membership does not imply agreement with every government aid decision.
Sources
Ukraine: military aidOpposes
Opposed PURL weapons funding in July 2026 and previously Russia sanctions. Coalition membership does not imply agreement with every government aid decision.
Sources
European UnionNot established
Not established
Sources
United StatesNot established
Not established
Sources
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Opposed PURL weapons funding in July 2026 and previously Russia sanctions. Coalition membership does not imply agreement with every government aid decision.
Sources
AgainstCzech PURL weapons funding; Russia sanctions in earlier party statements.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Opposed PURL weapons funding in July 2026 and previously Russia sanctions. Coalition membership does not imply agreement with every government aid decision.
Sources
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Opposed PURL weapons funding in July 2026 and previously Russia sanctions. Coalition membership does not imply agreement with every government aid decision.
Sources
Slovakia1
Slovenská národná strana (SNS)
In government
LeaderAndrej DankoParty chair
Political statusGovernment
Governing coalition partner. · Checked: 2025-06-06
Russia: sanctionsOpposes
Danko opposed donating MiG-29s; an SNS-initiated June 2025 parliamentary resolution opposed additional Russia sanctions. Smer is not thereby classified as far right.
Ukraine: military aidOpposes
Danko opposed donating MiG-29s; an SNS-initiated June 2025 parliamentary resolution opposed additional Russia sanctions. Smer is not thereby classified as far right.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Danko opposed donating MiG-29s; an SNS-initiated June 2025 parliamentary resolution opposed additional Russia sanctions. Smer is not thereby classified as far right.
AgainstDonating MiG-29 aircraft to Ukraine; imposing additional sanctions on Russia.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Danko opposed donating MiG-29s; an SNS-initiated June 2025 parliamentary resolution opposed additional Russia sanctions. Smer is not thereby classified as far right.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Danko opposed donating MiG-29s; an SNS-initiated June 2025 parliamentary resolution opposed additional Russia sanctions. Smer is not thereby classified as far right.
Romania3
Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor (AUR)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderGeorge SimionParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Opposition; cabinet negotiations in September 2026. · Checked: 2026-09-17
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Simion said in his 2025 presidential campaign that he would stop military assistance. No sufficiently specific sanctions policy established here.
Ukraine: military aidOpposes
Simion said in his 2025 presidential campaign that he would stop military assistance. No sufficiently specific sanctions policy established here.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Simion said in his 2025 presidential campaign that he would stop military assistance. No sufficiently specific sanctions policy established here.
AgainstMilitary assistance to Ukraine; Simion’s position during the 2025 presidential campaign.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Simion said in his 2025 presidential campaign that he would stop military assistance. No sufficiently specific sanctions policy established here.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Simion said in his 2025 presidential campaign that he would stop military assistance. No sufficiently specific sanctions policy established here.
S.O.S. România
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderDiana ȘoșoacăParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Șoșoacă rejected money and weapons for Ukraine at the St Petersburg economic forum in June 2026. Attendance alone does not establish Russian financing.
Ukraine: military aidOpposes
Șoșoacă rejected money and weapons for Ukraine at the St Petersburg economic forum in June 2026. Attendance alone does not establish Russian financing.
European UnionNot established
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Șoșoacă rejected money and weapons for Ukraine at the St Petersburg economic forum in June 2026. Attendance alone does not establish Russian financing.
AgainstMoney and weapons for Ukraine; Șoșoacă’s June 2026 forum statement.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Șoșoacă rejected money and weapons for Ukraine at the St Petersburg economic forum in June 2026. Attendance alone does not establish Russian financing.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Șoșoacă rejected money and weapons for Ukraine at the St Petersburg economic forum in June 2026. Attendance alone does not establish Russian financing.
Partidul Oamenilor Tineri (POT)
Status requires qualification
LeaderAnamaria GavrilăParty chair
Political statusSee details
Outside government; offered technocratic-cabinet support. · Checked: 2026-09-17
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Current representation is documented. A specific military-aid and sanctions policy was not established; unknown is not neutrality.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
Current representation is documented. A specific military-aid and sanctions policy was not established; unknown is not neutrality.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Current representation is documented. A specific military-aid and sanctions policy was not established; unknown is not neutrality.
AgainstInsufficient verified evidence for a concise opposition summary; unknown is not neutrality.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Current representation is documented. A specific military-aid and sanctions policy was not established; unknown is not neutrality.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Current representation is documented. A specific military-aid and sanctions policy was not established; unknown is not neutrality.
Bulgaria1
Vazrazhdane (Revival)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderKostadin KostadinovParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Russia: sanctionsOpposes
June 2026 proposals sought to ban arms transfers and assistance to Ukraine, veto further sanctions and lift existing sanctions.
Ukraine: military aidOpposes
June 2026 proposals sought to ban arms transfers and assistance to Ukraine, veto further sanctions and lift existing sanctions.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. June 2026 proposals sought to ban arms transfers and assistance to Ukraine, veto further sanctions and lift existing sanctions.
AgainstArms sales and assistance to Ukraine; Russia sanctions, rejected in June 2026.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. June 2026 proposals sought to ban arms transfers and assistance to Ukraine, veto further sanctions and lift existing sanctions.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. June 2026 proposals sought to ban arms transfers and assistance to Ukraine, veto further sanctions and lift existing sanctions.
Greece2
Ellinikí Lýsi (Greek Solution)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderKyriakos VelopoulosParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Opposition. · Checked: 2026-09-21
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Party statement explicitly opposes Greek weapons transfers to Ukraine. No current comprehensive sanctions policy established in this review.
Ukraine: military aidOpposes
Party statement explicitly opposes Greek weapons transfers to Ukraine. No current comprehensive sanctions policy established in this review.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Party statement explicitly opposes Greek weapons transfers to Ukraine. No current comprehensive sanctions policy established in this review.
AgainstSending Greek weapons to Ukraine, according to the party’s published statement.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Party statement explicitly opposes Greek weapons transfers to Ukraine. No current comprehensive sanctions policy established in this review.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Party statement explicitly opposes Greek weapons transfers to Ukraine. No current comprehensive sanctions policy established in this review.
Níkē (Victory)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderDimitris NatsiosParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Opposition. · Checked: 2025-11-28
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Natsios questioned weapons transfers and effects on Greek stocks in November 2025. That statement alone does not establish a blanket ban or a full sanctions policy.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
Natsios questioned weapons transfers and effects on Greek stocks in November 2025. That statement alone does not establish a blanket ban or a full sanctions policy.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Natsios questioned weapons transfers and effects on Greek stocks in November 2025. That statement alone does not establish a blanket ban or a full sanctions policy.
AgainstInsufficient verified evidence for a concise opposition summary; unknown is not neutrality.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Natsios questioned weapons transfers and effects on Greek stocks in November 2025. That statement alone does not establish a blanket ban or a full sanctions policy.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Natsios questioned weapons transfers and effects on Greek stocks in November 2025. That statement alone does not establish a blanket ban or a full sanctions policy.
Cyprus1
Ethnikó Laïkó Métopo (ELAM)
Status requires qualification
LeaderChristos ChristouParty chair
Political statusSee details
Outside cabinet; presidential system. · Checked: 2026-05-24
Russia: sanctionsSupports
Leader Christou endorsed sanctions against Russia in December 2024. A separate military-aid position was not established; sanctions support is a counterexample.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
Leader Christou endorsed sanctions against Russia in December 2024. A separate military-aid position was not established; sanctions support is a counterexample.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForSanctions against the invading country; specific Ukraine arms commitment unverified.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Leader Christou endorsed sanctions against Russia in December 2024. A separate military-aid position was not established; sanctions support is a counterexample.
AgainstRussia’s invasion of Ukraine, explicitly condemned in the cited evidence.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Leader Christou endorsed sanctions against Russia in December 2024. A separate military-aid position was not established; sanctions support is a counterexample.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Leader Christou endorsed sanctions against Russia in December 2024. A separate military-aid position was not established; sanctions support is a counterexample.
Croatia3
Domovinski pokret (Homeland Movement, DP)
In government
LeaderIvan PenavaParty chair
Political statusGovernment
Governing coalition partner. · Checked: 2026-08-24
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Being in a government that assists Ukraine does not by itself establish a party-specific policy on arms or every sanctions package.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
Being in a government that assists Ukraine does not by itself establish a party-specific policy on arms or every sanctions package.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Being in a government that assists Ukraine does not by itself establish a party-specific policy on arms or every sanctions package.
AgainstInsufficient verified evidence for a concise opposition summary; unknown is not neutrality.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Being in a government that assists Ukraine does not by itself establish a party-specific policy on arms or every sanctions package.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Being in a government that assists Ukraine does not by itself establish a party-specific policy on arms or every sanctions package.
Most (The Bridge)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderNikola GrmojaParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Opposition. · Checked: 2026-08-24
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Specific current arms and sanctions policies were not established. PopuList codes Most as far right from 2020.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
Specific current arms and sanctions policies were not established. PopuList codes Most as far right from 2020.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Specific current arms and sanctions policies were not established. PopuList codes Most as far right from 2020.
AgainstInsufficient verified evidence for a concise opposition summary; unknown is not neutrality.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Specific current arms and sanctions policies were not established. PopuList codes Most as far right from 2020.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Specific current arms and sanctions policies were not established. PopuList codes Most as far right from 2020.
Hrvatski suverenisti (Croatian Sovereignists)
Parliamentary oppositionPolitical statusOpposition
Russia: sanctionsNot established
No separately measurable election share. Specific arms and sanctions policies were not established in this review.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
No separately measurable election share. Specific arms and sanctions policies were not established in this review.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. No separately measurable election share. Specific arms and sanctions policies were not established in this review.
AgainstInsufficient verified evidence for a concise opposition summary; unknown is not neutrality.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. No separately measurable election share. Specific arms and sanctions policies were not established in this review.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. No separately measurable election share. Specific arms and sanctions policies were not established in this review.
Slovenia2
Slovenska demokratska stranka (SDS)
In government
LeaderJanez JanšaParty chair
Political statusGovernment
Leads government. · Checked: 2026-07-13
Sources
Russia: sanctionsSupports
Janša’s government supported strengthened aid and sanctions in July 2026. Far-right classification does not imply opposition to Ukraine’s defence.
Sources
Ukraine: military aidSupports
Janša’s government supported strengthened aid and sanctions in July 2026. Far-right classification does not imply opposition to Ukraine’s defence.
Sources
European UnionNot established
Not established
Sources
United StatesNot established
Not established
Sources
ForMilitary aid for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia; dated qualifications apply.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Janša’s government supported strengthened aid and sanctions in July 2026. Far-right classification does not imply opposition to Ukraine’s defence.
Sources
AgainstInsufficient verified evidence for a concise opposition summary; unknown is not neutrality.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Janša’s government supported strengthened aid and sanctions in July 2026. Far-right classification does not imply opposition to Ukraine’s defence.
Sources
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Janša’s government supported strengthened aid and sanctions in July 2026. Far-right classification does not imply opposition to Ukraine’s defence.
Sources
Nova Slovenija (NSi, New Slovenia)
In government
LeaderJernej VrtovecParty chair
Political statusGovernment
Governing partner; classification caveat. · Checked: 2026-06-05
Sources
Russia: sanctionsSupports
NSi explicitly supported defensive arms and sanctions in 2022. These are dated commitments. PopuList’s far-right classification differs from common Christian-democratic descriptions.
Sources
Ukraine: military aidSupports
NSi explicitly supported defensive arms and sanctions in 2022. These are dated commitments. PopuList’s far-right classification differs from common Christian-democratic descriptions.
Sources
European UnionNot established
Not established
Sources
United StatesNot established
Not established
Sources
ForMilitary aid for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia; dated qualifications apply.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. NSi explicitly supported defensive arms and sanctions in 2022. These are dated commitments. PopuList’s far-right classification differs from common Christian-democratic descriptions.
Sources
AgainstInsufficient verified evidence for a concise opposition summary; unknown is not neutrality.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. NSi explicitly supported defensive arms and sanctions in 2022. These are dated commitments. PopuList’s far-right classification differs from common Christian-democratic descriptions.
Sources
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. NSi explicitly supported defensive arms and sanctions in 2022. These are dated commitments. PopuList’s far-right classification differs from common Christian-democratic descriptions.
Sources
United Kingdom3
Reform UK
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderNigel FarageParty leader

Party leader
Political statusOpposition
Russia: sanctionsMixed / conditional
Farage backed use of frozen Russian assets in October 2025. No current party-wide arms commitment established here. Former Welsh leader Gill’s individual bribery conviction is documented separately.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
Farage backed use of frozen Russian assets in October 2025. No current party-wide arms commitment established here. Former Welsh leader Gill’s individual bribery conviction is documented separately.
European UnionDefends Brexit
In June 2026, Farage reaffirmed leaving the EU and pursuing British sovereignty outside it.
United StatesCooperation on trade
In Parliament on 4 February 2025, Farage advocated closer US ties and a free-trade agreement.
ForBrexit; closer US trade ties; using frozen Russian assets for Ukraine.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Farage backed use of frozen Russian assets in October 2025. No current party-wide arms commitment established here. Former Welsh leader Gill’s individual bribery conviction is documented separately.
AgainstReversing Brexit; deploying British troops to Ukraine; arms policy unverified.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Farage backed use of frozen Russian assets in October 2025. No current party-wide arms commitment established here. Former Welsh leader Gill’s individual bribery conviction is documented separately.
Selected facts
Public supportMusk turned against Farage2025-01-05
Elon Musk publicly called for Nigel Farage’s replacement as Reform UK leader, reversing his apparent backing. Farage rejected Musk’s support for Tommy Robinson.
Sources
Court caseGill sentenced for bribery2025-11-21
Former Reform UK Wales leader Nathan Gill received 10½ years in prison after admitting eight bribery offences committed as an MEP in 2018–2019, involving paid pro-Russian statements. This was Gill’s conviction, not a conviction of the party.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Farage backed use of frozen Russian assets in October 2025. No current party-wide arms commitment established here. Former Welsh leader Gill’s individual bribery conviction is documented separately.
Britain First
Outside parliament
LeaderPaul GoldingParty co-leader

Party co-leader
Political statusNo seats
Outside the House of Commons; checked 22 September 2026. · Checked: 2026-09-22
Russia: sanctionsNot established
LDPR contacts documented in 2022; no current comprehensive arms or sanctions policy established. Contacts do not prove payments.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
LDPR contacts documented in 2022; no current comprehensive arms or sanctions policy established. Contacts do not prove payments.
European UnionNot established
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. LDPR contacts documented in 2022; no current comprehensive arms or sanctions policy established. Contacts do not prove payments.
AgainstInsufficient verified evidence for a concise opposition summary; unknown is not neutrality.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. LDPR contacts documented in 2022; no current comprehensive arms or sanctions policy established. Contacts do not prove payments.
Details
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. LDPR contacts documented in 2022; no current comprehensive arms or sanctions policy established. Contacts do not prove payments.
Restore Britain
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderRupert LoweParty leader
Political statusOpposition
Parliamentary opposition; Rupert Lowe, one MP. · Checked: 2026-09-22
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Source-attributed far-right classification. Foreign aid is conditional on British interests; specific Ukraine-arms and Russia-sanctions policies unverified.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
Source-attributed far-right classification. Foreign aid is conditional on British interests; specific Ukraine-arms and Russia-sanctions policies unverified.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForForeign and military aid conditional on British interests; February 2026 policy.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Source-attributed far-right classification. Foreign aid is conditional on British interests; specific Ukraine-arms and Russia-sanctions policies unverified.
AgainstInsufficient verified evidence for a concise opposition summary; unknown is not neutrality.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Source-attributed far-right classification. Foreign aid is conditional on British interests; specific Ukraine-arms and Russia-sanctions policies unverified.
Details
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Source-attributed far-right classification. Foreign aid is conditional on British interests; specific Ukraine-arms and Russia-sanctions policies unverified.
Switzerland4
Schweizerische Volkspartei / UDC (SVP)
In governmentPolitical statusGovernment
Federal power-sharing party; two councillors. · Checked: 2026-09-21
Russia: sanctionsOpposes
Opposes easing indirect arms-transfer restrictions and EU-aligned sanctions. The neutrality referendum of 27 September 2026 had not occurred at this article’s cutoff.
Ukraine: military aidOpposes
Opposes easing indirect arms-transfer restrictions and EU-aligned sanctions. The neutrality referendum of 27 September 2026 had not occurred at this article’s cutoff.
European UnionNot established
Not established
United StatesNot established
Not established
ForThe 2026 Swiss neutrality initiative restricting participation in non-UN sanctions.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Opposes easing indirect arms-transfer restrictions and EU-aligned sanctions. The neutrality referendum of 27 September 2026 had not occurred at this article’s cutoff.
AgainstRelaxing weapons re-export restrictions; Swiss participation in sanctions against Russia.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Opposes easing indirect arms-transfer restrictions and EU-aligned sanctions. The neutrality referendum of 27 September 2026 had not occurred at this article’s cutoff.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Opposes easing indirect arms-transfer restrictions and EU-aligned sanctions. The neutrality referendum of 27 September 2026 had not occurred at this article’s cutoff.
Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union / UDF (EDU)
Status requires qualificationPolitical statusSee details
No federal cabinet seat; SVP parliamentary group. · Checked: 2026-09-21
Russia: sanctionsOpposes
Supports the 2026 neutrality initiative restricting non-UN sanctions. A separate specific weapons policy was not established.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
Supports the 2026 neutrality initiative restricting non-UN sanctions. A separate specific weapons policy was not established.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForThe 2026 Swiss neutrality initiative restricting participation in non-UN sanctions.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Supports the 2026 neutrality initiative restricting non-UN sanctions. A separate specific weapons policy was not established.
AgainstSwiss participation in sanctions outside the neutrality initiative’s UN exceptions.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Supports the 2026 neutrality initiative restricting non-UN sanctions. A separate specific weapons policy was not established.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Supports the 2026 neutrality initiative restricting non-UN sanctions. A separate specific weapons policy was not established.
Lega dei Ticinesi (LdT)
Status requires qualificationPolitical statusSee details
No federal cabinet seat; SVP parliamentary group. · Checked: 2026-09-21
Russia: sanctionsOpposes
Quadri’s September 2026 column opposes EU-aligned Russia sanctions. It does not establish a specific weapons-transfer vote.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
Quadri’s September 2026 column opposes EU-aligned Russia sanctions. It does not establish a specific weapons-transfer vote.
European UnionNot established
ForThe 2026 Swiss neutrality initiative restricting participation in non-UN sanctions.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Quadri’s September 2026 column opposes EU-aligned Russia sanctions. It does not establish a specific weapons-transfer vote.
AgainstEU-aligned Russia sanctions in Switzerland; Quadri’s signed September 2026 column.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Quadri’s September 2026 column opposes EU-aligned Russia sanctions. It does not establish a specific weapons-transfer vote.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Quadri’s September 2026 column opposes EU-aligned Russia sanctions. It does not establish a specific weapons-transfer vote.
Mouvement Citoyens Genevois (MCG)
Status requires qualificationPolitical statusSee details
No federal cabinet seat; SVP parliamentary group. · Checked: 2026-09-21
Russia: sanctionsNot established
No specific current aid or sanctions policy established. Membership in the SVP group is not evidence of agreement on every issue.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
No specific current aid or sanctions policy established. Membership in the SVP group is not evidence of agreement on every issue.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. No specific current aid or sanctions policy established. Membership in the SVP group is not evidence of agreement on every issue.
AgainstInsufficient verified evidence for a concise opposition summary; unknown is not neutrality.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. No specific current aid or sanctions policy established. Membership in the SVP group is not evidence of agreement on every issue.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. No specific current aid or sanctions policy established. Membership in the SVP group is not evidence of agreement on every issue.
Denmark3
Dansk Folkeparti (DF)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderMorten MesserschmidtParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Opposition. · Checked: 2026-09-21
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Calls for reducing Denmark’s disproportionate aid burden and rebuilding domestic defence, while praising earlier support. This is retrenchment, not a verified rejection of all assistance.
Ukraine: military aidMixed / conditional
Calls for reducing Denmark’s disproportionate aid burden and rebuilding domestic defence, while praising earlier support. This is retrenchment, not a verified rejection of all assistance.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForRebuilding Danish defence; negotiations with security guarantees; reducing Denmark’s aid burden.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Calls for reducing Denmark’s disproportionate aid burden and rebuilding domestic defence, while praising earlier support. This is retrenchment, not a verified rejection of all assistance.
AgainstA disproportionate Danish aid burden; not a categorical rejection of assistance.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Calls for reducing Denmark’s disproportionate aid burden and rebuilding domestic defence, while praising earlier support. This is retrenchment, not a verified rejection of all assistance.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Calls for reducing Denmark’s disproportionate aid burden and rebuilding domestic defence, while praising earlier support. This is retrenchment, not a verified rejection of all assistance.
Danmarksdemokraterne (DD)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderInger StøjbergParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Russia: sanctionsSupports
European programme supports arms-production capacity for Ukraine; DIIS analysis identifies support for military aid and sanctions.
Ukraine: military aidSupports
European programme supports arms-production capacity for Ukraine; DIIS analysis identifies support for military aid and sanctions.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForExpanding weapons production for Ukraine; military assistance and sanctions against Russia.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. European programme supports arms-production capacity for Ukraine; DIIS analysis identifies support for military aid and sanctions.
AgainstInsufficient verified evidence for a concise opposition summary; unknown is not neutrality.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. European programme supports arms-production capacity for Ukraine; DIIS analysis identifies support for military aid and sanctions.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. European programme supports arms-production capacity for Ukraine; DIIS analysis identifies support for military aid and sanctions.
Borgernes Parti (BP)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderLars Boje MathiesenParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Russia: sanctionsNot established
A 2025 candidate interview said Ukraine policy was unsettled and proposed a referendum. No later definitive party-wide arms or sanctions line established.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
A 2025 candidate interview said Ukraine policy was unsettled and proposed a referendum. No later definitive party-wide arms or sanctions line established.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForA candidate proposed an aid referendum in 2025; settled policy unverified.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. A 2025 candidate interview said Ukraine policy was unsettled and proposed a referendum. No later definitive party-wide arms or sanctions line established.
AgainstInsufficient verified evidence for a concise opposition summary; unknown is not neutrality.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. A 2025 candidate interview said Ukraine policy was unsettled and proposed a referendum. No later definitive party-wide arms or sanctions line established.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. A 2025 candidate interview said Ukraine policy was unsettled and proposed a referendum. No later definitive party-wide arms or sanctions line established.
Sweden1
Sverigedemokraterna (SD)
Status requires qualification
LeaderJimmie ÅkessonParty leader

Party leader
Sources
Political statusSee details
Outside cabinet; post-election formation unresolved. · Checked: 2026-09-21
Sources
Russia: sanctionsSupports
Backed increased military aid and stronger Russia sanctions. Previously supported Kristersson externally; do not treat the outgoing arrangement as a settled new government.
Sources
Ukraine: military aidSupports
Backed increased military aid and stronger Russia sanctions. Previously supported Kristersson externally; do not treat the outgoing arrangement as a settled new government.
Sources
European UnionMembership with limits
Supports Swedish EU membership while seeking less supranational power.
United StatesUnassessed
Support for NATO does not establish approval of all US policies.
Electoral change↓ -3.06 ppNational lower-house election · party vote share (%) · 2022-09-11 → 2026-09-13
National lower-house election · party vote share (%) · 2022-09-11 → 2026-09-13
ForGreater military aid to Ukraine; stronger sanctions; Swedish defence capacity.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Backed increased military aid and stronger Russia sanctions. Previously supported Kristersson externally; do not treat the outgoing arrangement as a settled new government.
Sources
AgainstRussian aggression; trade in goods enabling Russian military production.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Backed increased military aid and stronger Russia sanctions. Previously supported Kristersson externally; do not treat the outgoing arrangement as a settled new government.
Sources
Selected facts
CounterexampleMilitary aid for Ukraine2024-05-24
The Sweden Democrats agreed with the government on a SEK 75 billion military-aid framework for Ukraine for 2024–2026. This is a documented counterexample to treating all far-right parties as opponents of military support.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Backed increased military aid and stronger Russia sanctions. Previously supported Kristersson externally; do not treat the outgoing arrangement as a settled new government.
Sources
Finland1
Perussuomalaiset / Finns Party (PS)
In government
LeaderRiikka PurraParty chair
Political statusGovernment
Orpo governing coalition partner. · Checked: 2026-09-21
Russia: sanctionsSupports
2024 European programme endorses sustained weapons and economic aid. Sanctions support is evidenced through coalition implementation, not an audit of every party vote.
Ukraine: military aidSupports
2024 European programme endorses sustained weapons and economic aid. Sanctions support is evidenced through coalition implementation, not an audit of every party vote.
European UnionNot established
ForMilitary aid for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia; dated qualifications apply.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. 2024 European programme endorses sustained weapons and economic aid. Sanctions support is evidenced through coalition implementation, not an audit of every party vote.
AgainstInsufficient verified evidence for a concise opposition summary; unknown is not neutrality.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. 2024 European programme endorses sustained weapons and economic aid. Sanctions support is evidenced through coalition implementation, not an audit of every party vote.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. 2024 European programme endorses sustained weapons and economic aid. Sanctions support is evidenced through coalition implementation, not an audit of every party vote.
Estonia1
Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond (EKRE)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderMartin HelmeParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Opposition. · Checked: 2026-09-21
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Supported assistance while criticising depletion of Estonian stocks and limiting exposure. The position is conditional; a current complete sanctions line was not established.
Ukraine: military aidMixed / conditional
Supported assistance while criticising depletion of Estonian stocks and limiting exposure. The position is conditional; a current complete sanctions line was not established.
European UnionNot established
Not established
United StatesNot established
Not established
ForContinued, conditional Ukraine assistance, while preserving Estonia’s own military capacity.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Supported assistance while criticising depletion of Estonian stocks and limiting exposure. The position is conditional; a current complete sanctions line was not established.
AgainstDepleting Estonia’s military stocks and excessive exposure; 2023 campaign position.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Supported assistance while criticising depletion of Estonian stocks and limiting exposure. The position is conditional; a current complete sanctions line was not established.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Supported assistance while criticising depletion of Estonian stocks and limiting exposure. The position is conditional; a current complete sanctions line was not established.
Latvia1
Nacionālā apvienība (National Alliance, NA)
In government
LeaderIlze IndriksoneParty chair
Political statusGovernment
Governing partner again from May 2026. · Checked: 2026-09-21
Russia: sanctionsSupports
Backs substantial military aid, use of frozen Russian assets and stronger trade restrictions. A clear counterexample to blanket pro-Russia classification.
Ukraine: military aidSupports
Backs substantial military aid, use of frozen Russian assets and stronger trade restrictions. A clear counterexample to blanket pro-Russia classification.
European UnionNot established
ForMilitary aid for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia; dated qualifications apply.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Backs substantial military aid, use of frozen Russian assets and stronger trade restrictions. A clear counterexample to blanket pro-Russia classification.
AgainstImports of Russian and Belarusian goods; the party demands stronger restrictions.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Backs substantial military aid, use of frozen Russian assets and stronger trade restrictions. A clear counterexample to blanket pro-Russia classification.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. Backs substantial military aid, use of frozen Russian assets and stronger trade restrictions. A clear counterexample to blanket pro-Russia classification.
Lithuania1
Nemuno aušra (Nemunas Dawn, NA)
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderRemigijus ŽemaitaitisParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Opposition after leaving coalition in June 2026. · Checked: 2026-09-21
Russia: sanctionsMixed / conditional
MPs split on 2025 national Russia/Belarus restrictions: three for, one against, eleven abstained. This is not a vote on all EU sanctions.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
MPs split on 2025 national Russia/Belarus restrictions: three for, one against, eleven abstained. This is not a vote on all EU sanctions.
European UnionNot established
ForInsufficient verified evidence for a concise summary of supported policies.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. MPs split on 2025 national Russia/Belarus restrictions: three for, one against, eleven abstained. This is not a vote on all EU sanctions.
AgainstMPs split on national Russia/Belarus restrictions; no uniform rejection established.
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. MPs split on 2025 national Russia/Belarus restrictions: three for, one against, eleven abstained. This is not a vote on all EU sanctions.
Details
Classification: Classified as far right by The PopuList 4.0 for its latest covered period; not a legal designation. MPs split on 2025 national Russia/Belarus restrictions: three for, one against, eleven abstained. This is not a vote on all EU sanctions.
Ukraine3
Svoboda
Status requires qualification
LeaderOleh TyahnybokParty chair
Political statusSee details
One constituency MP, Oksana Savchuk; non-affiliated, no party faction. · Checked: 2026-09-22
Russia: sanctionsSupports
Published programme supports US/UK lethal military aid and sanctions on Russian actors.
Ukraine: military aidSupports
Published programme supports US/UK lethal military aid and sanctions on Russian actors.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForUkrainian statehood, stronger defence, economic nationalism and military partnerships.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Published programme supports US/UK lethal military aid and sanctions on Russian actors.
AgainstRussian domination, occupation of Ukrainian territory and oligarchic power.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Published programme supports US/UK lethal military aid and sanctions on Russian actors.
Details
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Published programme supports US/UK lethal military aid and sanctions on Russian actors.
Right Sector (civil movement/party)
Outside parliamentPolitical statusNo seats
No separate Rada seats; current civil organisation’s scale unverified. · Checked: 2026-09-22
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Far-right civil organisation; not every historically associated military unit. Opposition to Russia does not establish a current foreign-aid or sanctions platform.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
Far-right civil organisation; not every historically associated military unit. Opposition to Russia does not establish a current foreign-aid or sanctions platform.
European UnionNot established
ForUkrainian national statehood and organised resistance to Russian aggression.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Far-right civil organisation; not every historically associated military unit. Opposition to Russia does not establish a current foreign-aid or sanctions platform.
AgainstRussian domination; current detailed foreign-policy platform remains unverified.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Far-right civil organisation; not every historically associated military unit. Opposition to Russia does not establish a current foreign-aid or sanctions platform.
Details
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Far-right civil organisation; not every historically associated military unit. Opposition to Russia does not establish a current foreign-aid or sanctions platform.
National Corps (civil party)
Status requires qualification
LeaderAndriy BiletskyFounding leader, elected in 2016 (historical role)

Founding leader, elected in 2016 (historical role)
Political statusSee details
No separate seats; wartime suspension reported in 2023, resumption unverified. · Checked: 2026-09-22
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Historical far-right party, distinct from today’s Azov and Third Army Corps. Current aid and sanctions policy unverified.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
Historical far-right party, distinct from today’s Azov and Third Army Corps. Current aid and sanctions policy unverified.
European UnionNot established
ForHistorically: strong Ukrainian state and Baltic–Black Sea regional cooperation.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Historical far-right party, distinct from today’s Azov and Third Army Corps. Current aid and sanctions policy unverified.
AgainstHistorically: Russian influence; preferred an alternative to EU integration.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Historical far-right party, distinct from today’s Azov and Third Army Corps. Current aid and sanctions policy unverified.
Details
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Historical far-right party, distinct from today’s Azov and Third Army Corps. Current aid and sanctions policy unverified.
United States2
Proud Boys
Outside parliament
LeaderEnrique TarrioFormer national chairman

Former national chairman
Political statusNo seats
Non-party extremist movement; current membership size unverified. · Checked: 2026-09-22
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Western-chauvinist and anti-left movement; not all Republicans. Current Ukraine aid and Russia sanctions policies unverified.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
Western-chauvinist and anti-left movement; not all Republicans. Current Ukraine aid and Russia sanctions policies unverified.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForSelf-described Western chauvinism, male fraternity and traditional gender hierarchy.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Western-chauvinist and anti-left movement; not all Republicans. Current Ukraine aid and Russia sanctions policies unverified.
AgainstLeft-wing activism, feminism and challenges to its cultural hierarchy.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Western-chauvinist and anti-left movement; not all Republicans. Current Ukraine aid and Russia sanctions policies unverified.
Selected facts
Court caseTrump’s pardon and sentence reductions2025-01-20
On 20 January 2025, Trump pardoned former Proud Boys leader Enrique Tarrio and commuted Ethan Nordean’s and Joseph Biggs’s sentences to time served. Commutation did not erase their convictions. On 10 July 2026, a judge dismissed the remaining cases against four Proud Boys at the Justice Department’s request.
Details
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Western-chauvinist and anti-left movement; not all Republicans. Current Ukraine aid and Russia sanctions policies unverified.
Oath Keepers
Outside parliament
LeaderStewart RhodesFounder (2009)
Political statusNo seats
Outside party politics; organisational strength unverified. · Checked: 2026-09-22
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Anti-government militia. On 4 August 2026 a judge vacated Rhodes’s and other defendants’ January 6 convictions at DOJ request. Aid/sanctions policy unverified.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
Anti-government militia. On 4 August 2026 a judge vacated Rhodes’s and other defendants’ January 6 convictions at DOJ request. Aid/sanctions policy unverified.
European UnionNot established
Not established
United StatesNot established
Not established
ForIts interpretation of constitutional rights, armed citizens and militia mobilisation.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Anti-government militia. On 4 August 2026 a judge vacated Rhodes’s and other defendants’ January 6 convictions at DOJ request. Aid/sanctions policy unverified.
AgainstGun control and federal orders it portrays as unconstitutional.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Anti-government militia. On 4 August 2026 a judge vacated Rhodes’s and other defendants’ January 6 convictions at DOJ request. Aid/sanctions policy unverified.
Selected facts
Court caseRhodes: commutation, then dismissal2025-01-20
On 20 January 2025, Trump commuted Oath Keepers founder Stewart Rhodes’s sentence to time served; he did not give Rhodes a full pardon in that proclamation. On 4 August 2026, Judge Amit Mehta granted the Justice Department’s request to dismiss the cases and vacate convictions of Rhodes and other Oath Keepers defendants.
Details
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Anti-government militia. On 4 August 2026 a judge vacated Rhodes’s and other defendants’ January 6 convictions at DOJ request. Aid/sanctions policy unverified.
Russia3
LDPR
Parliamentary opposition
LeaderLeonid SlutskyParty chair
Political statusOpposition
Parliamentary systemic opposition; supports Putin’s war. · Checked: 2026-09-22
Russia: sanctionsOpposes
A legal far-right party. Slutsky’s July–August 2026 statements oppose Western arms for Ukraine and EU sanctions.
Ukraine: military aidOpposes
A legal far-right party. Slutsky’s July–August 2026 statements oppose Western arms for Ukraine and EU sanctions.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForRussian ultranationalism, a strong state and Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. A legal far-right party. Slutsky’s July–August 2026 statements oppose Western arms for Ukraine and EU sanctions.
AgainstWestern military aid to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. A legal far-right party. Slutsky’s July–August 2026 statements oppose Western arms for Ukraine and EU sanctions.
Details
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. A legal far-right party. Slutsky’s July–August 2026 statements oppose Western arms for Ukraine and EU sanctions.
Russian Imperial Movement (RIM)
Outside parliamentPolitical statusNo seats
UK-proscribed since July 2025; linked armed wing fights for Russia. · Checked: 2026-09-22
Russia: sanctionsNot established
White-supremacist monarchist movement. Its Russian Imperial Legion fights Ukraine; separate aid and sanctions platform unverified.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
White-supremacist monarchist movement. Its Russian Imperial Legion fights Ukraine; separate aid and sanctions platform unverified.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForA new Russian imperial state, monarchy and white supremacy.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. White-supremacist monarchist movement. Its Russian Imperial Legion fights Ukraine; separate aid and sanctions platform unverified.
AgainstUkrainian resistance to its territorial aims; pluralistic ethnic equality.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. White-supremacist monarchist movement. Its Russian Imperial Legion fights Ukraine; separate aid and sanctions platform unverified.
Details
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. White-supremacist monarchist movement. Its Russian Imperial Legion fights Ukraine; separate aid and sanctions platform unverified.
Rusich
Outside parliament
LeaderVoislav Torden (Yan Petrovsky)Historical commander, documented in 2022

Historical commander, documented in 2022
Sources
Political statusNo seats
US-sanctioned paramilitary formation fighting alongside Russian forces. · Checked: 2026-09-22
Russia: sanctionsNot established
Neo-Nazi group. On 31 August 2026 Finland reduced Torden’s sentence to 12.5 years, retaining war-crime convictions; further appeal planned. Policy on aid/sanctions unverified.
Ukraine: military aidNot established
Neo-Nazi group. On 31 August 2026 Finland reduced Torden’s sentence to 12.5 years, retaining war-crime convictions; further appeal planned. Policy on aid/sanctions unverified.
European UnionNot established
United StatesNot established
ForNeo-Nazi ideology and armed participation on Russia’s side.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Neo-Nazi group. On 31 August 2026 Finland reduced Torden’s sentence to 12.5 years, retaining war-crime convictions; further appeal planned. Policy on aid/sanctions unverified.
AgainstUkrainian forces; a separate civil political programme is unverified.
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Neo-Nazi group. On 31 August 2026 Finland reduced Torden’s sentence to 12.5 years, retaining war-crime convictions; further appeal planned. Policy on aid/sanctions unverified.
Details
Classification: Included on the basis of the cited sources; this organisation is outside the dataset’s core scope. Neo-Nazi group. On 31 August 2026 Finland reduced Torden’s sentence to 12.5 years, retaining war-crime convictions; further appeal planned. Policy on aid/sanctions unverified.
A majority — but of whom, and on which question?
The strongest comparison is a common test, rather than a collection of provocative quotations. On 24 February 2026, the European Parliament voted on a resolution affirming Ukrainian sovereignty, calling for stronger military support and sanctions, and demanding further separation from Russian energy. Within the three groups most relevant to the nationalist right, opposition plus abstention amounted to 90 of 150 recorded votes: 60%. Against votes alone were 45 of 150, or 30%. Calling the entire 60% ‘pro-Russian’ would erase a meaningful difference.
The group breakdown is more revealing than the combined number. ECR recorded 51 votes for, two against and six abstentions. Patriots for Europe recorded eight for, 21 against and 39 abstentions. ESN recorded one for and 22 against. Those are three very different political profiles. The result supports a precise conclusion: on this test, resistance to the resolution was concentrated in Patriots and ESN, while ECR largely backed it.
It does not establish that a majority of all far-right parties in Europe are controlled by Moscow. A parliamentary group is not a single party; these groups include differently classified parties; the UK, Norway and Switzerland are absent from this vote. Nor is abstention a declaration of geopolitical neutrality. The country atlas below therefore separates military aid, sanctions, electoral support and documented Russian connections. Where the record is incomplete, it says so. europarl.europa.eu howtheyvote.eu popu-list.org
Across the Atlantic: one fracture, different mechanisms
In the United States, this conflict has reached the centre of a major party holding the House majority. On 20 April 2024, 112 House Republicans opposed the Ukraine aid bill and 101 supported it; one voted ‘present’ and four did not vote. The bill nevertheless passed, 311–112. This is a concrete historical measure of the split within the American right, not a classification of every Republican as far right. The political importance lies in the leverage: opposition inside a major party can threaten assistance on a scale that marginal European movements cannot. clerk.house.gov
Britain reveals a different route: access to political voices. The Nathan Gill judgment establishes an individual bribery operation, with instructions and prepared statements entering parliamentary debate. On the continent, Russian loans, cooperation agreements and anti-sanctions programmes show several routes of influence operating together. Their effects can converge even when their origins differ. A paid intervention, an ideological preference and an electoral calculation are not the same thing — but each can weaken the coalition supporting Ukraine. judiciary.uk lorientlejour.com newsv2.orf.at afd.de
The Balkans make a simple Russia-versus-Ukraine label still less adequate. The European Commission’s November 2025 report said Serbia had not joined EU sanctions against Russia, while also noting support for Ukraine and cooperation against sanctions circumvention. Serbia is a comparison of state policy here, not another party added to the far-right count. Alongside the contrasting Croatian, Slovenian, Bulgarian and Greek profiles, it shows why one must distinguish sanctions, weapons and diplomatic alignment instead of colouring the whole region red. enlargement.ec.europa.eu
The pattern is therefore best understood as a coalition of interests rather than a uniform command structure. For some actors, hostility to Brussels or the liberal establishment takes priority over resisting Moscow. For others, the perceived Russian threat makes support for Ukraine part of national defence — the Nordic and Italian counterexamples matter for precisely this reason. The decisive question is what these parties would actually stop, fund or approve once they acquire power. ambkiev.esteri.it
Six perspectives on the same political divide
Selected evidence from different years and institutions. These examples explain mechanisms; they are not a single comparable ranking.
United States
112 against / 101 forHouse Republicans on Ukraine aid, 20 April 2024. One ‘present’, four non-voters. The bill passed with bipartisan support.
EU parliamentary right
51 / 8 / 1 votes forECR / Patriots / ESN, 24 February 2026. The sharp split between groups matters more than a shared right-wing label.
Western Europe
Loans, pacts, programmesRN’s 2014 Russian loan, FPÖ’s 2016 agreement and AfD’s 2025 programme document different kinds of connection and policy.
United Kingdom
8 bribery offencesNathan Gill’s 2025 conviction turns an influence allegation into a proven individual case. It does not establish collective party guilt.
Balkans
Sanctions ≠ all assistanceThe EU’s 2025 Serbia report records non-alignment with sanctions against Russia alongside support for Ukraine. Neighbouring parties differ too.
Nordic countries and Italy
The counterweight on the rightSupport for Ukrainian defence among Nordic nationalists and Meloni’s government prevents a credible analysis from treating the right as one pro-Russian bloc.
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: AfD leads with 38.2%
AfD received 38.2% of second votes in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, ahead of SPD on 35.5%, according to the official preliminary result. This strengthens its regional electoral position, but is neither a nationwide victory nor an automatic route into government. The 37% shown in the 18:00 screenshot was a forecast, not the election result. These figures concern the state parliament, not the Bundestag; government formation is a separate process. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern electoral authority · Official preliminary result
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: AfD leads with 38.2%
State election, 20 September 2026 · Official preliminary second-vote result · Selected parties · Turnout: 78.1%.
Why electoral weight matters more than a headcount of parties
Counting one small movement and one governing party as one unit each can badly misrepresent political power. National vote shares show domestic reach; parliamentary seats and coalition agreements determine access to government; EU unanimity rules can give a single government a veto. None of these is interchangeable with the number of party logos on a conference poster.
The atlas uses national parliamentary elections, not presidential contests, regional victories or opinion polls. France’s first-round party labels, Dutch proportional votes and Swiss party-strength figures come from different electoral systems; their percentages can be compared as indicators of reach but cannot be added into a European vote share. A coalition result is marked as such and is not assigned in full to every constituent party.
Power can also reverse. Fidesz’s record of obstruction while governing Hungary remains relevant, but it must be described historically after the 2026 change of government. Similarly, a party leaving a coalition does not erase its past decisions. The status and date alongside each entry prevent yesterday’s governing influence from being presented as today’s. popu-list.org
Three routes by which Moscow benefits
The first route is policy convergence. Ending weapons deliveries, lifting sanctions or accepting territorial conquest would improve Russia’s position even without a secret payment. AfD’s 2025 programme is a clear example: it calls for sanctions to end, Nord Stream to be restored and Ukraine to remain outside NATO and the EU. These are published political demands, so their consequences can be assessed directly.
The second route is access: loans, cooperation agreements, political visits and recurring conferences create relationships through which messages and interests circulate. The third is covert influence: concealed media funding and networks that investigators or sanctions authorities identify as instruments of interference. Evidence of the third route must be established case by case; the existence of the first two does not automatically prove it.
This distinction makes the analysis stronger. A party’s conduct can weaken Ukraine without the party being a Russian agent. Conversely, an openly acknowledged loan or agreement is harder to dismiss than an unsupported allegation that every critic of aid is on the Kremlin’s payroll. afd.de lorientlejour.com newsv2.orf.at consilium.europa.eu justice.gov

How policy can benefit Russia without a payment
An analytical chain of consequences, not a claim of secret coordination.
The meetings: who gathered, where and for what purpose?
The network did not begin in 2022. A private meeting in Vienna in May 2014 brought together Russian conservative intermediaries and figures from the French, Austrian and Bulgarian right. In March 2015, Rodina’s St Petersburg forum provided a public platform for ultranationalists and neo-Nazis. Later came formal agreements with United Russia: FPÖ in December 2016 and Lega in March 2017.
The distinction between these events matters. The 2018 Metropol discussion concerned a proposed oil-financing scheme; the investigation was subsequently shelved without establishing a completed transaction. The 2024 creation of Patriots for Europe and its 2025 Madrid summit were public European party-building events. They demonstrate political cooperation, but attendance at them is not evidence of Kremlin direction. The chronology identifies the participants and the type of relationship instead of presenting every meeting as the same conspiracy. lemonde.fr osw.waw.pl newsv2.orf.at ansa.it ansa.it ansa.it ots.at eunews.it patriots.eu
International meetings: the far right and its political contacts
2014–2025 · Selected documented participants; roles are those held at the event. Flags identify countries, not official delegations. Some meetings also included mainstream conservatives: participation alone establishes neither far-right classification nor Russian financing or control.
Russia — Konstantin Malofeev, Alexander Dugin · Organiser and ideological contacts
France — Aymeric Chauprade · Adviser to Marine Le Pen
Austria — Heinz-Christian Strache · FPÖ
Bulgaria — Volen Siderov · Ataka
31 May 2014 · Palais Liechtenstein. Le Monde reports Marion Maréchal-Le Pen’s presence at the closing dinner; this is not evidence of participation in the whole conference.
Sources and qualifications
Germany — Udo Voigt · NPD, not AfD
Italy — Roberto Fiore · Forza Nuova
Greece — Golden Dawn representatives
United Kingdom — Nick Griffin, Jim Dowson · Griffin was a former leader already expelled from the BNP
Russia — Local Rodina branch · Organiser
22 March 2015 · The British diplomatic digest lists nine European countries: Germany, Italy, Greece, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Sweden, Spain, Denmark and Belgium. US participants are also noted. This is a selection; an omitted name does not mean a delegation was absent.
Sources and qualifications
Italy — Matteo Salvini · Lega · Deputy prime minister
France — Marine Le Pen · RN
Germany — Jörg Meuthen · AfD
Netherlands — Geert Wilders · PVV
18 May 2019 · Piazza Duomo. Selected speakers, not a complete list of participants.
Sources and qualifications
Spain — Santiago Abascal · Vox
Hungary — Viktor Orbán · Fidesz · Prime minister
Poland — Mateusz Morawiecki · PiS · Prime minister
France — Marine Le Pen · RN
28–29 January 2022 · Madrid Summit. The final statement criticised Russia’s actions at Europe’s eastern borders. This meeting cannot be described as unanimous support for the Kremlin.
Sources and qualifications
Hungary — Viktor Orbán · Fidesz · Prime minister
United States — Andy Harris, Paul Gosar, Keith Self · Republican members of Congress
Spain — Santiago Abascal · Vox
Netherlands — Geert Wilders · PVV
Belgium — Tom Van Grieken · Vlaams Belang
Poland — Mateusz Morawiecki · Former prime minister, PiS
25–26 April 2024 · Selected confirmed participants. Sharing a conference does not mean that all speakers held the same views on Russia and Ukraine. A Reform UK delegation is not included without confirmation.
Sources and qualifications
Spain — Santiago Abascal · President of Vox and the Patriots.eu party
Hungary — Viktor Orbán · Prime minister, Fidesz
France — Marine Le Pen · RN parliamentary group leader
Italy — Matteo Salvini · Deputy prime minister, Lega
Netherlands — Geert Wilders · PVV
8 February 2025 · Hotel Marriott Auditorium. Selected speakers at the Patriots summit, reported by EFE and Europa Press. Participation documents a political contact; it does not by itself establish a shared position on Russia.
Sources and qualifications
United States — Donald Trump · President
Argentina — Javier Milei · President
19–22 February 2025 · Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center, Oxon Hill, Maryland. Trump and Milei spoke on 22 February. This selection records two confirmed speakers, not the entire conference. CPAC is a broader conservative event; a shared stage does not prove Russian control.
Sources and qualifications

Eight encounters, different kinds of connection
Dates, participants and countries. European party summits are distinguished from Russian-hosted meetings and bilateral pacts.
St Petersburg, 22 March 2015: the contradiction in plain sight
A British diplomatic report released under freedom-of-information rules lists representatives from nine European countries: Sweden, Spain, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Belgium, Greece and the United Kingdom. It names Nick Griffin and Jim Dowson as the British participants and notes that France’s National Front was absent. US white nationalists Jared Taylor and Sam Dickson were also reported at the gathering. These were party figures and activists, not delegations representing their countries’ governments.
Among the identifiable organisations were Germany’s NPD, Greece’s Golden Dawn, Italy’s Forza Nuova and Bulgaria’s Ataka. Griffin was a former BNP leader who had already been expelled; describing his presence as an official BNP delegation would be inaccurate. Nor should NPD attendance be silently reassigned to AfD, or Swedish extremists to the Sweden Democrats.
The organiser was Rodina’s St Petersburg branch. Contemporary reporting said the Kremlin had neither formally endorsed nor condemned the forum. The documented paradox is nevertheless stark: a gathering promoting cooperation with Russia and opposition to sanctions welcomed openly extremist forces while Russian officials used accusations of fascism to delegitimise Ukraine. The forum was not an official summit of the Russian government, and its largely marginal participants were not a census of Europe’s entire right. assets.publishing.service.gov.uk osw.waw.pl themoscowtimes.com splcenter.org rferl.org

Who was represented in St Petersburg?
22 March 2015 · Nine European countries in the released British report. The people represented parties or movements, not their national governments.
Three countries, different forms of influence
Ukraine illustrates why electoral support and influence must be separated. In 2019, the joint Svoboda list, which included Right Sector and National Corps candidates, won 2.15%. That is one result, not three percentages to add together. Research subsequently recorded wartime suspension of political activity. The old vote therefore cannot measure their social reach or the strength of military units with historical personnel links.
Russia presents a different setting. LDPR is a legal parliamentary party: its systemic opposition coexists with support for Putin’s war. The Russian Imperial Movement and Rusich are armed extremist actors, not comparable electoral competitors. Sources document the Imperial Legion’s and Rusich’s participation alongside Russian forces. Parliamentary access, organisational autonomy and a role in violence must be examined separately rather than placed in one ranking.
In the United States, Proud Boys and Oath Keepers cannot stand for the Republican Party or the MAGA constituency. Trump’s January 2025 clemency and subsequent court dismissals are documented decisions affecting individuals; they do not establish organisational command. Across these cases, institutional access and geopolitical alignment matter more than a simple headcount. Far-right classification alone neither proves Kremlin loyalty nor predicts a common position on Ukraine.
The contradiction extends beyond a conference room
US Treasury sanctions of 15 September 2022 described Rusich as a neo-Nazi paramilitary group fighting alongside Russia’s military in Ukraine. In April 2020, the US designated the Russian Imperial Movement and leaders under its global-terrorism sanctions authority; subsequent Treasury action described fundraising that supported Russian fighters in Ukraine. These official findings undermine any simple claim that Moscow’s war represents a consistent campaign against the far right.
They do not make all European nationalists neo-Nazis. The relevant finding is narrower and more concrete: Russian state rhetoric about ‘denazification’ coexists with cooperation or operational alignment involving documented far-right extremists. That is a contradiction in conduct, not merely a dispute about labels. home.treasury.gov 2017-2021.state.gov home.treasury.gov
A proven bribery case: Nathan Gill
On 21 November 2025, a British court sentenced former MEP Nathan Gill to 10½ years after guilty pleas to eight bribery counts concerning December 2018–July 2019. The judge identified Viktor Medvedchuk as the ultimate source of requests and money, passed through Oleg Voloshyn. Gill delivered scripted statements and recruited other MEPs; the judge expressly did not establish that those colleagues knew of his payments. This is a conviction, not merely an allegation. Gill later briefly led Reform UK in Wales; the case does not establish that the whole party or Nigel Farage received these payments. judiciary.uk

From money to a parliamentary statement
Nathan Gill · sentencing remarks, 21 November 2025. Eight bribery counts; 10½ years. A documented individual case, not a verdict on an entire party.
Follow the money — and keep the units separate
The French National Front’s €9.4 million loan from the First Czech-Russian Bank in 2014 created a documented financial relationship. RN announced repayment in September 2023. That is a real historical connection, not evidence of a debt still outstanding today. FPÖ’s and Lega’s agreements with United Russia were political arrangements; their existence should not be converted into an invented payment total.
The 2024 US case against two RT employees described an alleged operation directing nearly $10 million through intermediaries into an American online-content company. Prosecutors reported almost 2,000 videos and more than 16 million YouTube views. Those figures describe alleged funding and distribution, not the number of persuaded voters. In Europe, the Council’s May 2024 sanctions decision described Voice of Europe as a vehicle for paying propagandists and building influence over representatives of political parties.
A separate US intelligence assessment made public in September 2022 estimated at least $300 million in covert Russian political financing abroad since 2014. It covered countries and political forces beyond Europe’s far right. Russia’s planned 2025 mass-media budget of 137.2 billion roubles is yet another category: public media spending, not a ledger of covert payments. Adding these amounts would double-count or combine incompatible scopes and currencies.
Ukraine faces a substantial information challenge, but it is incorrect to say that it has no international broadcasting: UATV exists. The more useful question is how reach, distribution and covert sponsorship differ. There is no audited, like-for-like Russia-versus-Ukraine propaganda budget in these sources, so this article does not manufacture a ratio. lorientlejour.com justice.gov consilium.europa.eu 2021-2025.state.gov sipri.org uatv.ua

Four figures — four different kinds of evidence
Amounts are not comparable totals and are not added together. Dates and evidential status are essential.
The Polish test: sovereignty for whom?
For readers in Poland, the substantive issue is what a party’s programme would do to security east of the EU. Shared positions on migration or criticism of Brussels do not establish shared interests on Russia. AfD’s demands concerning sanctions, Nord Stream and Ukraine’s alliances must be weighed against Poland’s own security debate, independently of applause for any individual election result.
Poland’s right is itself divided. PiS-led governments delivered weapons to Ukraine; disputes about agricultural imports, historical memory or accession conditions do not erase that record. Konfederacja and its constituent or former constituent currents require separate treatment, particularly after organisational splits. The atlas marks the common 2023 electoral result so that it is not counted several times. Neither Polish society nor the Polish right can be represented by a handful of celebratory social-media posts.
The counterexamples elsewhere are equally substantive: Meloni’s government signed a security agreement with Ukraine, and Nordic right-wing parties have backed military support. Their existence does not cancel the networks and obstruction documented here. It shows that ideology alone does not predict foreign policy; geography, threat perception, coalition commitments and electoral strategy also matter. afd.de gov.pl ambkiev.esteri.it
Alternative for Germany’s victory in the September 6, 2026 election was for the parliament of Saxony-Anhalt. It is an important regional result, but not a victory in a Bundestag election or a takeover of power across Germany. The distinction matters: a state parliamentary election result does not give the party sole control over German foreign policy. Election results — Saxony-Anhalt electoral authority; AP report.
There was no single reaction to this result in Poland. Jacek Wilk of the Confederation of the Polish Crown welcomed it. Zdzisław Krasnodębski called for an end to AfD’s isolation. Criticism, however, came not only from Donald Tusk, but also from Anna Zalewska of PiS and the head of the president’s cabinet, Paweł Szefernaker. The latter pointed to the party’s pro-Russian proposals. These examples reveal divisions on the political right as well; they do not support claims of widespread enthusiasm among Poles. Compilation of statements: Notes from Poland.
Offensive remarks: the speaker and context matter
The expression “the African Americans of Europe” recurs in this dispute. It is attributed to Fabian Keubel, an AfD activist and former member of the leadership of its youth wing in Saxony. According to a Polish Radio report of August 4, 2026, he used it in the context of commemorating the victims of the Warsaw Uprising in Berlin. The report also describes his mockery of Polish historical memory and demands for reparations. Polish Radio.
Accuracy requires two qualifications. The wording was “the African Americans of Europe”, not “the Africans of Europe”. It is a statement by a particular activist, not a quotation from the party’s programme. Keubel is not a member of the Bundestag. Attributing these words to all AfD members would be an unjustified generalisation. Criticism of the remark concerns the use of a comparison to demean two communities, not the name of an ethnic group itself.
The danger does not require a single command centre
The evidence establishes a durable set of Russian connections and a large bloc resisting stronger support for Ukraine. It also establishes a split. The most defensible conclusion is not that every far-right party has been bought, but that parts of this political family repeatedly advance policies that reduce the cost of Russian aggression — sometimes through documented relationships, sometimes through their own political choices.
That distinction changes what should be monitored: votes on arms and finance, sanctions policy, coalition agreements, disclosed borrowing and investigated money flows. A conference photograph shows access; a signed pact shows a relationship; a financial record shows a transaction; a parliamentary vote shows a decision. Together they provide a stronger account of influence than either a blanket accusation or the claim that these contacts are politically meaningless.
How to read this investigation
The directory includes only organisations classified by the cited sources as far right, covering both radical-right and extreme-right currents; borderline cases and parties classified only as conservative are excluded. The PopuList 4.0 classifications refer to their own coverage periods, distinct from the stated election and government-status dates. Newer or non-parliamentary groups outside its core scope require separate source-based classification. Votes for alliances and their component parties must not be added together. “Unknown” means insufficient verified evidence, not neutrality. The European Parliament figure of 60% concerns ECR, PfE and ESN in one specified vote: it is neither a census of all far-right parties nor proof of external control.
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